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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the biopolitics of the credit card industry and its governance of 
consumers through consumer-citizenship obligations and the transformation of consumer 
data into valuable information commodities.  Biometrics and transactional data trails or 
‘data doubles’ are used to securitize identity, define responsible citizenship, and to 
delimit rights and access to valuable social resources. Binding data to consumer-citizens 
enables the credit card industry to exercise biopower over consumer subpopulations 
through social sorting based on categories of risk and value. Subpopulations are then both 
acted upon and sold to third parties as ‘valuable information commodities.’ This thesis 
analyzes Visa and Mastercard Canadian credit card policies to determine how the 
consumer-citizenship is constituted and the extent to which Canadian federal legislation 
(Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act enable) enables or 
constrain credit card companies exercise of biopower over consumer populations. This 
thesis concludes that credit card companies enact a form of biopolitical governance-at-a-
distance through entrepreneurship and responsibilization. Corporate policies enable the 
aggregation and commodification of personal information, for purposes not explicitly 
made known to customers, in order to drive economic growth for the credit card industry 
and its ‘third parties.’ 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the biopolitics of the credit card industry 
in its governance over the consumer population through consumer-citizenship, and the 
manufacturing of consumers into valuable information commodities. Consumer-
citizenship is exercised through rights, responsibilities, and performative acts (Isin & 
Nielson, 2008: 2, 18; Rygiel, 2010: 30; Rose, 1999: 241). The adoption of biometrics and 
the generation of transactional data trails illustrate the duties and responsibilities of 
citizenship, as it ensures the rights to security and access (Gates, 2010: 419, 428, 429). 
Citizenship is integral to the role of biopolitics as it facilitates the management of the 
population through the exercise of freedom and choice of the consumer (Rygiel, 2010: 
36). It is through the entrepreneurship of the citizen-consumer that invokes neoliberal 
governing ‘at a distance’ (Rose, 2000: 234), which regulates the behaviour of subjects by 
appealing to their interests without challenging their autonomous nature (Foucault, 2008: 
63-65; Miller & Rose, 2008: 39).‘Biometrics as the ‘measurement of life’ (Ajana, 2013: 
3) works through identification and authentication technology by analyzing the “unique 
characteristics of human bodies, such as fingerprint, iris, voice etc.” (Rekola, 2013: 1). 
For example, fingerprinting and facial recognition verifies transactions (Engagement 
Bureau, 2016; Harrer, 2016); purchases can be verified through one’s heartbeat 
(MarketWired, 2015) or by snapping a selfie photo (Engagement Bureau, 2016). The 
employment of biometric technology acts as a biopolitical technique that differentiates 
the population based on authentication of identity and level of contribution to the 
economy (Ajana, 2013: 134). While the expansive consumer data trails wrought through 
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tracking a range of activities produces an informational profile (Gates, 2010: 428; 
Whitson & Haggerty, 2008: 574) or ‘data double’ (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 606).  
This ‘securitization of identity,’ the binding of data, through the citizenship duties 
of consumers (Gates, 2010: 420; Rose, 1999: 241) has enabled the credit card industry to 
identify subjects’, monitor financial activity, consumption patterns and connections, and 
to sort subpopulations into varying categories of risk and value (Gates, 2010: 419, 423, 
424). Surveillance technologies not only collect and sort the consumer population but 
also sell this information (Whitson & Haggerty, 2008: 574; Zwick & Knott, 2009: 224), 
transforming consumer conduct into ‘valuable information commodities’, which allows 
institutions to derive economic value and control the consumer population (Zwick & 
Knott, 2009: 224). This utilization of consumer data illustrates biopolitical surveillance 
that capitalizes on making life calculable (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 268; 282; 
Foucault, 1978: 143). It is biopower that enables the governance over the population by 
mobilizing and shaping collective characteristics in order to reach political objectives like 
wealth and security (Foucault, 1994: 221; Rabinow & Rose, 1994, xi). Individuals as 
“working, trading, living beings” are integral to these aims (Foucault, 1988: 156). 
Through consumer-citizenship, biopower is exerted over individuals, enabling the 
management of life through the constitution and regulation of populations (Rygiel, 2010: 
93). As a result, mobility and access to resources are controlled through the sorting of 
consumers into desirable or undesirable subpopulations, mobilizing freedom for the 
desirable while limiting it for the undesirable (Ajana, 2013: 125, 133; Byrne, 2007; 
Foucault, 1978: 142-3; Foucault, 2003: 32-33, 249, 254-5; Foucault, 2007: 11-20; Muller, 
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2004: 287, 288; Rose, 1999: 243; Rygiel, 2010: 93; van Munster, 2005: 6; Zwick & 
Knott, 2009: 241).  
Research Questions 
In light of concerns on the credit card industry’s commodification of consumers, I 
seek to understand how consumers are biopolitically manufactured as consumer-citizens, 
and are responsibilized in their own production through biometric and transactional data. 
I analyze Visa and Mastercard Canadian consumer privacy policies, the literature (journal 
articles, newspaper articles, internet material) on the articulation and connection between 
the securitization of identity, risk-management, convenient access, and the manufacturing 
of consumers into marketing commodities through data. I also analyze characteristics 
associated with consumer awareness or non-awareness on the collection and transmission 
of consumer data.  
 This research asks: 
1. How do terms and conditions documents convey and operationalize self-
responsiblization, particularly the securitization of identity, risk management, and access?  
2. What information is collected about consumers and what can be passed to third-
parties? Are these parties identified or identifiable?  
3. Are consumers made aware of potential risks and effects of their actions? 
4. Are there opt-out conditions? When is this permitted and what is the process? 
In pursuing these questions, the analysis brings insight into how credit card 
companies operate within Canada, particularly how personal information is collected, 
used, stored and disclosed, and how the securitization of identity and the 
commodification of consumers are enabled. These documents are a means for consumers 
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to become aware of the conditions they are consenting to, the effects it may have, and 
potentially take control in limiting the sorting, analysis and distribution of their data 
double. As a biopolitical apparatus exploiting consumer populations through the 
dissemination of the data doubles across multiple domains of practice, it is imperative 
that consumers are aware that they are constituted as information commodities, and how 
this affects their access to social, economic, and political resources. Furthermore, the 
analysis on the Canadian Privacy Regime - sections of the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) offers the legal framework on how 
organizations can act in relation to the utilization of personal information. The analysis 
examines whether or not the credit card companies meet the legal requirements, as well 
as if the legislation enables or constrains the exercise of biopolitics within the credit card 
policy terms. 
The literature on the biopolitical dimensions of identity-related developments 
within the area of surveillance research focuses on managing populations’ mobility, 
access to resources, and security by how they are defined and produced as risks and value 
through biometric, biographical, and transactional data (Aas, 2006; Ajana, 2013; 
Amoore, 2006; Boutin, 2016; Cheney-Lippold, 2011; Epstein, 2007; Gates, 2010; 
Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Ruppert, 2011; Rygiel, 2010; van der Ploeg 1999a, 1999b, 
2003; Wilson, 2006; Whitson & Haggerty, 2008; Zwick & Knott, 2009). This thesis adds 
to the identity-management literature by examining the credit card industry and the 
biopolitical strategy involved in the management of consumer populations: The focus of 
this study is to analyze the literature, and credit card companies ‘terms and conditions’ on 
how consumer-citizenship is enabled, and how consumers are manufactured into vectors 
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of securitization and risk-management. The second aspect concerns how consumers are 
manufactured into valuable information commodities through consumer data (biometrics 
and transactional data) and marketed to third parties. A key concern is whether credit 
card customers are made aware through ‘fine print’ on the collection and transmission of 
consumer data. It is argued that it is a biopolitical strategy because consumers are 
governed through the mobilization of freedom, choice, and self-governance, which 
subsequently enables their aggregation into subpopulations of value and risk based on the 
characteristics and behaviour that are seen to drive economic growth.  
Firstly, I will outline the shift from disciplinary power to biopolitical power and 
the differences in techniques of management and constitution of subjects (individuals v. 
populations) in the move from enclosed surveillance to risk surveillance. Then, I will 
demonstrate how biopolitics as security is directly connected with the credit card 
industry’s management of the consumer population through consumer-citizenship, with 
accentuation on the exercise of self-governance, freedom, and choice. The analysis on the 
securitization of identity will highlight how it is an obligatory and performative act of 
consumer-citizenship, and how, as a self-responsibilized response to risk and instrument 
for self-entrepreneurship, it renders the consumer population governable.  
Secondly, I will discuss how biometric technologies are a self-identifying tool of 
privilege that differentiates between included and excluded subpopulations. I will show 
how credit card companies promote these technologies for consumer security, efficiency, 
and entitlements, while fostering a biopolitical agenda in which the body and everyday 
life are subject to modalities of control. I will then discuss the techniques and measures 
credit card companies’ use when quantifying consumer risk. The aim is to show how the 
	  	   6	  
industry defines customers as calculable and predictable ‘codes’ or Deleuzian dividuals 
while limiting loss and maximizing profit.  
Finally, I will illustrate how biometric data in collaboration with transactional 
data creates subpopulations of risk and value, as a tradable commodity and how the use, 
dissemination, and manipulation of personal information, exploits subjects through an 
examination of corporate privacy policies surrounding personal data. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 From Discipline to Biopower  
Foucault states that power over life began to emerge in the 17th century (Foucault, 
1995: 139). The first form of power is an “anatomo-politic of the human body,” a 
disclipinary power that focused on the individual human body, and its correction through 
confinement, “centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, … its usefulness and 
its docility” (Ibid: 139). The second form of power represented a bio-power directed at 
governing populations for its production and regulation, “a bio-politics of the population” 
it “focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving 
as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality (Ibid: 139). 
Disciplinary power emerged in 18th century Europe within many institutions or 
‘enclosures,’ from the school to prisons, mental hospitals, and monasteries (Foucault, 
1995: 25, 138, 248-9). Disciplinary techniques exercised normalizing techniques through 
spaces, gazes, and hierarchies. Subjects were highly individualized; strategically they 
were easier to manage if separated through various dividing strategies (Feeley & Simon, 
1992: 450; Foucault, 1995: 167; 248; Lynch, 1998: 840). The purpose was to reform 
individuals considered disruptive to communities (unruly children, prisoners, mentally 
unstable) constitutive norms through segregation and rehabilitation (Feely & Simon, 
1992: 470; Foucault, 1995: 231, 317; Lynch, 1998: 840).  
 Through enclosure, a ‘political anatomy’ was born, one which involved the 
calculated manipulation and control of the body and its behaviour through hierarchical 
observation, normalizing judgement, and examination (Foucault, 1995: 138; Rygiel, 
2010: 33). Individuals learned to govern and discipline themselves, and to participate in 
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the production of attitudes, actions and desires that were deemed societally appropriate, 
such as acquiring the ‘taste for work’ (Foucault, 1995: 163-169, 239, 240, 243, 248). The 
panopticon (Foucault, 1995: 248-9) was the political architecture utilized in prison and 
other social institutions, it had a functional and effective design that ensured every cell in 
the building was viewable at all times. It individualized, isolated, and normalized through 
a continual surveillance and cellular separation while diminishing the defiant powers of 
individuals and simultaneously maximizing knowledge, security, observation, docility, 
and social and economic utility (Rose, 1999: 187; Foucault, 1995: 167; 208-209, 239, 
249-52). This was perceived as the most effective method for controlling and managing 
deviations to ensure public safety and elimination of crime (Foucault, 1978: 144; 1995: 
182-187, 231, 239; 2003: 253; Rose, 1999: 187).  
Biopower has a different set of security practices and techniques than disciplinary 
power. “Bio” originates from the Greek vocabulary, which has two different words for 
life: Zoe refers to bare life, and bios signifies qualified life or life in a particular form 
(Esposito 2008: 15). In the latter form, it is a power over life whose inclination is to make 
life live, to “foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault, 1978: 138). 
Biopower manages controls, and intervenes at the level of life in order to increase its 
vitality (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 266; Foucault, 1978: 143). These processes 
transform elements of human life by utilizing knowledge and power to facilitate an 
apparatus/dispositive (Kristensen, 2013: 11, 16, 19, 44). An apparatus consists of 
“discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions,” a 
strategic function that responds to a need (Foucault, 1980: 194). The foundation of 
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biopolitics is contingent on objectives that seek to rationalize phenomenon distinctive to 
populations (Foucault, 1982: 779-784; 2000: 409-410). Elements of life become 
subjected to negotiation, management, regulation and manipulation (Rygiel, 2010: 35). 
Whereas disciplinary power framed the danger posed by the plague for example, through 
practices of confinement, biopower addresses it through modulated and targeted 
strategies that map the incidence of contingent behaviour and link it with an assortment 
of environmental and biological aspects (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 277; Foucault, 
2007: 1-2).  
The construction of subpopulations developed in the 18th century through 
innovative practices of accounting and statistics, depicting patterns of behaviour relating 
to death, life expectancy, fertility, reproduction, longevity, demographics, wealth, 
resources etc. (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 273; Foucault, 1978: 139, 148; Hacking, 
1990; 256; Kristensen, 2013: 16; Rygiel, 2010: 93). The creation of these statistical 
systems were ignited by both civil and commercial and juridical or military-logistical 
enterprises, as they generated valuable effects i.e. thwarting depopulation, cultivating a 
growing tax base, and delivering a steady supply of manpower for the military (Hacking, 
1990: 256; Kelly, N.D). Populations were rendered more productive and amendable to 
the maximization of potentialities and minimization of negatives for health, longevity and 
economic growth (Foucault, 1978: 142-3; Foucault, 2007: 11-20). These techniques, 
according to Foucault, were not representative either of the legal code or of disciplinary 
power. “The law prohibits and discipline prescribes” but the function of security is to 
respond to elements of reality by limiting, checking, and regulating it (Foucault, 2007: 
47). The ‘regularization’ of biopower manages fluctuations within the population (Rygiel, 
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2010: 102). Foucault labelled this ‘dispositif du sécurité; there is no biopolitics that is not 
inherently a security apparatus (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 266, 283; Foucault, 
2007: Lecture 1, 2). In other words, biopolitics always consists of securitization (Rygiel, 
2010: 102).  
Security interprets particular phenomena as a natural truth, in which specific 
points require modification through techniques. Apparatuses of security facilitate a 
regulatory and promotive function within the population in order for the phenomenon to 
be cancelled or managed, ensuring favourable effects and an optimization of life 
(Foucault, 2003: 246; Foucault, 2007: 59). In the pursuit of economic profit, biopolitical 
industries capitalize on life by managing the “contingent economy of species life” (Dillon 
& Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 282) by analyzing the flows of information that present 
probabilities and patterns of behaviour, correlations and distributions (Dillon & Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008; 267-268, Hardt & Negri 2004: 427). This circulation enables industries 
to monitor and translate “contingency into risk, and risk into a tradable asset” (Dillon & 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 268). The amalgamation of behaviour and economy is fundamental 
in mapping out the “correlations of contingent behaviour” to determine the “cost of 
behaviour” (Foucault, 2007: 1-2). The noncompliant, risky, ‘enemy,’ or ‘excluded 
populations’ may be coerced into compliancy or punished (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 
2008: 291; Foucault, 2003: 254). For example, from an insurer’s perspective a population 
is measured as a risk pool, a cost-benefit analysis is used to devise a band-width of 
acceptable performance and when the cost associated with a loan surpasses the cost of 
risky behaviour (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 427; Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 278). Lemke 
(2011) states that Rudolf Kjellén was one of the first to suggest that the state is a “natural 
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creature;” social struggles, or tensions of life, surface from different interests of classes 
and groups (Lemke, 2011: 10). Furthermore, social hierarchies exist and are justifiable 
due to particular facets of evolutionary history (Lemke, 2011: 18-19). Inequalities are 
inevitable as they represent the difference between those who are self-responsiblized in 
choice and freedom and those who are not (Ericson, Barry & Doyle, 2000: 533).  
Biopolitical security apparatuses govern through the production of freedom, 
appealing to the interests of subjects for free exchange within the market (Foucault, 2008: 
63-65). This facilitates responsiblized self-governance, self-entrepreneurship and 
regulation of subjects’ contingencies of risk and elements of freedom (Dillon & Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008: 280-281; 291-292; Foucault, 2007). Freedom enforces the enactment of 
security, where the management and surveillance over the species-body enables the 
extraction of vital signs for the advancement, potentiality, and exploitation of life’s 
prospective (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; 273, 291; Foucault, 2007: 310). For 
instance, the effective regulation of laissez-faire1 affects a population by generating profit 
(Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 280; Foucault, 2007: 21, 59; Kristensen, 2013: 61). The 
notion of laissez-faire states that, in order for there to be beneficial effects to a given 
population, people must have the ability to participate in the naturalness intrinsic within 
the population, i.e. to freely exchange within commerce (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 
280; Foucault, 2007: 350; Kristensen, 2013: 61). The rationalization of laissez-faire is 
justified through empirical techniques of collecting data; this permits an efficient way of 
enabling the production of knowledge of populations, and for managing fluctuations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Laissez-faire is a political-economic principle in which government should not 
intervene relating to market and free trade (Merriam-Webster, 2017). 
2 “the study of human control functions and of mechanical and electronic systems 
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associated with natural phenomena (Foucault 2007: 59). Through both positive and 
negative means, biopower acts upon populations “as a sort of technical-political object of 
management and government” (Foucault, 2007: 70). The positive is connected to the 
strengthening of beneficial effects concurring with the principle of laissez-faire i.e. 
endorsing health through medicine and increasing profit through the activity of the 
population within the market. The negative is to decrease risks that are linked to these 
regularities, for example lessening the mortality rate associated with a given phenomenon 
through apparatuses of security (Ibid: 70-74; Kristensen, 2013: 62). Therefore, biopolitics 
in relation to security will proceed to limit risk by acting on the population to support 
positive phenomena (Kristensen, 2013: 62). 
In relation to the credit card industry, the concept of bio-power draws attention to 
how the consumer-citizen is identified and sorted. Power produces circumstances for 
knowledge to be obtained and enables how subjects are constituted as members of a 
population (Foucault, 1995: 194). Knowledge is extracted through a continual assessment 
of the contingent properties of people’s lives using technological devices of surveillance 
and security, i.e. (biometrics, tracking and screening of transactional data), to determine 
which subpopulations exhibit preferred lifestyles capable of self-regulation. Different 
subpopulations demonstrate varying competences in their lives towards self-
improvement. Some behaviour, and subsequently some subpopulations are less 
competent, less valid, or resistant to responsiblized self-governance (Dillon & Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008: 291; Foucault, 1997: 297). Techniques of power unveil these hierarchies. 
Through observable constants, some subjects are identified and produced as superior with 
surplus value, others are rendered inferior and excluded, limited with access to activities 
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(Foucault, 2003: 32-33; Rygiel, 2010: 38). This totalizing power that determines the 
constitution of subjects is justifiable in that it increases the chance of an objective or goal 
being met for the function of the whole i.e. economic growth (Foucault, 2003: 32-33; 
254-6).  
The concept of bio-power is fundamental to consumer-citizenship; it is both 
constraining and productive as it necessitates the management of the population through 
the exercise of freedom and choice of the consumer (Rygiel, 2010: 36). Foucault (1994) 
states that a relationship of power is defined not by its direct action on others, but instead 
by its exercise upon the actions of individuals (137). Power can only be exerted on 
subjects that are free; “slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains, only 
when he has some possible mobility, even a chance of escape” (139). This means 
“freedom is a prerequisite for the exercise of power” (Rygiel, 2010: 36). Consumer-
citizens can be perceived as free, because they are recognized as having human agency, 
the capacity to act, and choice in their behaviour and conduct (Ibid: 36). Capitalist 
principles of access and entitlement are ingrained within consumer-citizenship; it ignites 
the abilities of free individuals by commending practices of marketization and 
technologisation (Ajana, 2013: 121, 122). Credit card companies exert power over 
subjects by appealing to consumer interests for convenience and security i.e. financial 
transactions through security apparatuses like biometrics (Engagement Bureau, 2016; 
MarketWired, 2015; PYMNT, 2017). Securitization as a component of biopolitics 
regulates difference and hierarchy wherein particular facets of life are enhanced enabling 
the population to be more effectively governed (Rygiel, 2010: 102). Biometric 
technologies emerge as a security apparatus that governs the entire population (Ajana, 
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2013: 113; Rygiel, 2010: 102). The implementation of biopower within circuits of 
consumption encourages consumers to regulate and protect identity by actualizing their 
‘savoir-faire’ (capacity for appropriate action) and optimising their ‘savoir-être’ (know 
how) (Ajana, 2013: 118). Yet by placing the onus on consumers to mitigate risk, it 
capitalizes on neoliberalist ethos of self-autonomy, choice, and freedom (Ajana, 2013: 
117, 118; Miller & Rose, 2008: 92). The credit card industry then collects and monitors 
data on patterns of behaviour and activity of the consumer population, enabling the 
production of knowledge and management of fluctuations involved with risk and security 
for the accumulation of economic growth (Gates, 2010: 419).  
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2.2 Securitization of Identity 
The credit card industry exercises biopower by managing consumer populations 
through identity, and risk-management, with the securitization of identity being one of its 
fundamental mechanisms (Ajana, 2013: 108; 113). The	  securitization of identity enables 
the industry to observe consumer behaviour and control access to financial systems 
(Gates, 2010: 419). It involves processes and technologies that bind financial, 
transactional data, and other distinguishing data to subjects through space and time as 
they cross throughout networks, participate in exchanges with various organizations, and 
gather assets and debts (Gates, 2010: 420, 424). Rose (1999) states “securitization of 
identity as the proliferation of sites where individuals are made responsible for 
establishing their official identity as a condition of access to the rights and 
responsibilities of (consumer) citizenship” (p. 241). Citizenship practices are always 
performative in action; subjects constitute themselves as citizens through acts (Isin & 
Nielson, 2008: 2, 18; Rygiel, 2010: 30). Practices include employment, consumption, and 
financial transactions in particular, all which demand the authentication of identity (Rose, 
1999: 241). For example, you need verification of “who you are to open bank accounts, 
obtain credit cards, finance, loans and mortgages, to obtain goods or services, or to claim 
benefits” (CIFAS, 2007). Muller (2004) states that securitization implements citizenship; 
biometrics as an apparatus either restricts or advances particular rights, entitlements, 
resources and spaces (p. 279, 288). In other words, it is a performative act, a duty of 
citizenship to securitize identity, an actualization of ‘savoir-faire’ and ‘savoir-être’. 
Treating the body as a ‘password’ discriminates between ‘qualified and disqualified 
bodies’, enabling the management of populations, or ‘identity management’ (Muller, 
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2004: 280, 287, 288; Woodward, Orlans & Higgins, 2003: 198). This securitization 
process can be viewed as a “biopolitical maintenance or regulation of the welfare of 
(consumer) citizens” (Muller, 2004: 285). It appeases security concerns of the financial 
institution and the consumer, (Ibid: 287) ensuring confidence for the consumer, and 
generating capital for the industry (Gates, 2010: 429; Muller, 2004: 287).  
 Since the 1980s, retail banking and credit card industries constructed an extensive 
network infrastructure and directed a significant amount of focus in developing 
techniques of automatically identifying and tracking subjects that accessed that network 
(Gates, 2010: 419). As a result of this process, “identity” became defined as a 
“disembodied aggregate of transaction-generated data”, a “digital representation” of the 
subject generated over instances and space through the continuous gathering of data 
(Ibid: 419). It entails particular characteristics and behaviour that describes the profile of 
the individual, not ‘who’ is this person, but ‘are you authorized’ and ‘what’ kind of a 
person is this in terms of their fit within a particular subpopulation (Caplan & Torpey, 
2001: 3; Butler, 2005: 31; Muller, 2004: 287). Due to the dispersal of data, innovative 
technologies, conceptions of risk and demand to control mobility, transactions and access 
to entitlements (Ajana, 2013: 113), identity became recognized as a valuable commodity 
that requires securitization, a process whereby an identity is contained, a group formed 
and protected, by both industry and individual efforts (Ajana, 2013: 79, 116, 117, 118; 
Gates, 2010: 419). The concept of identity fraud and theft in particular is a common risk 
that faces the interests of the population, and the securitization of identity through 
biometrics and various other tactics responds as a rationale to this occurrence (Ajana, 
2013: 114). Thus, it is integral to understand how the problematisation of identity fraud 
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functions as a means of mobilizing the “citizen, the consumer” to be “self-managed, self-
governed and self-responsiblized” (Ibid: 114).  
 Identity theft can be perceived as a phenomenon in which biopower acts upon 
through a positive and negative manner to concur with principle of laissez-faire and limit 
risk (see above) (Foucault, 2007: 70-74; Kristensen, 2013: 62). For example, economic 
growth and potentialities are maximized through the activity of consumer populations 
within the market (Gates, 2010: 418; Whitson & Haggerty, 2008: 574). Furthermore, by 
verifying identity, the personal and organizational risks associated with identity theft are 
decreased (Ajana, 2013: 118-119; Gates, 2010: 419; Muller, 2004: 280; Whitson & 
Haggerty, 2008: 574). Identity fraud is positioned as a systemic risk resulting from the 
“productiveness of the market” – a methodical byproduct of an innovative, 
technologically “enabled credit system” (Marron, 2008: 23). Yet, identity fraud impedes 
upon the principle of laissez faire for beneficial effects (see Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 
2008: 280; Foucault, 2007: 350; Kristensen, 2013: 61), the ability of a consumer citizen 
to exercise self-entrepreneurship and freedom within consumerism activities (Marron, 
2008: 24). The access to someone’s personal data, the stealing of ones identity (Ajana, 
2013: 114), the tampering of one’s credit ratings, and the affect on ‘consumer identity’ 
threatens the ability to consume, and subsequently, limits the ability to govern and 
establish a life (Ajana, 2013: 117; Marron, 2008: 23-5). In this light, the financial 
industry shifts the onus onto the consumer to become culpable of risk by adopting self-
management, and risk-managing activities (Ajana, 2013: 117; Gates, 2010: 419, 427; 
Marron, 2008: 34). The industry partakes in ‘risk shifting’, in which responsibility of risk 
falls on the individual; ‘blameworthiness’ is reinforced onto the individual in case of a 
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‘failure’ or ‘noncompliance’ with procedures (McDermott, Henne & Hayes, 2017: 2). 
Procedures and rules function to facilitate the management of risk and maintain 
successful organizations (McDermott, et al. 2017: 3). Furthermore, administrative 
practices and knowledge ensures the public ascertains the perception of risk, and 
positions the appropriate resources (Salter, 2008: 253). As Whitson & Haggerty (2008) 
state citizens are encouraged and induced to bring elements of their disembodied data 
double into securitizing methods of regulation and examination (Whitson & Haggerty, 
2008: 574). In this light, identity theft, (a failure) would be blamed on the consumer 
because they did not comply with the risk managing rules of citizenship. In other words, 
through risk, individuals are directed in their conduct, which enables the production, 
ordering, management and controlling of populations (Rygiel, 2010: 67). 
 These individual efforts are positioned around a neoliberal rationale of risk - 
‘prudentialism,’ in which risk is interpreted as shared, yet is individually acted upon 
through the calculation and minimization of risk by a citizen (Ajana, 2013: 114, 117; 
Aradau & van Munster, 2007: 103; Rygiel, 2010: 67). Securitized identities are asserted 
based on the construction of ‘existential’ and ‘potential’ risks (Ajana, 2013: 111, 112; 
Williams, 2003: 520). In other words, the securitization of identity through biometrics 
technology manages a whole population through an individualized response to the 
collective of risks confronting identity (Ajana, 2013: 113). Rose (1999: 239) refers to this 
mode of self-governance as an “individualization of security,” and Whitson and Haggerty 
(2008: 574) refer to it as “care of the virtual self.” A subject who is rational becomes 
“skilled and knowledgeable about risk” (Rose, 2000: 328). As their own financial 
managers, identity securitizers are to monitor interest rates (Gates, 2010: 425) and credit 
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card account statements, purchase identity theft insurance, and contact creditors if errors 
are suspected (Whitson & Haggerty, 2008: 578). Ajana (2013) notes how financial 
institutions like Citibank, Barclays, Lloyds TSB and Capital One foster consumers as 
managers of identity theft risks through advertising, protective services, and online 
security tips. Varying services allow consumers to monitor credit activities and to receive 
information on security (116). The same logic advises the adoption of biometric 
technologies for the securitization of identity, as the credit card industry positions the 
technology as an essential measure for consumer security and benefit, and a necessary 
tool for daily financial transactions (Gates, 2010: 427). As Muller (2004) states, the 
increasingly preoccupation with identity theft or identity fraud has a significant relation 
between the ‘securitization of citizenship’ and ‘identity management’ (287). He goes on 
to discuss how the financial industry emphasizes the securitization of identity through 
tactics of ‘threat and insecurity.’ For example, “Citibank’s high-profile advertisement 
campaign is exemplary in ‘securitizing private identity’ through both textual/speech acts, 
and image rhetoric. With fictional episodes involving large-scale fraudulent credit card 
use, Citibank ads reinforce (or introduce) the need to ‘secure’ private identity in everyday 
consumer transactions” (Ibid: 287). The prominence laid on authentication and 
authorization by financial institutions has initiated the use of biometrics as a 
securitization apparatus, and “technology of subjectivity” (Ajana, 2013: 118), which has 
assisted in the production of the hybrid “consumer-citizen” (Muller 2004: 287).  
Securitization is then an integral piece that underlines the triad of “biometrics, 
identity, and citizenship” (Ajana, 2013: 108). Nikolas Rose (2000: 324) concept of 
neoliberal governing “at a distance” through intervening “technologies of freedom,” 
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illustrates the credit card industry’s governance over the population through consumer 
citizen self-governance.  Under neoliberalism, “to govern better, the state must govern 
less; to optimize the economy, one must govern through the entrepreneurship of 
autonomous actors. Once responsibilized and entrepreneuralized, they would govern 
themselves within a state-secured framework of law and order” (Rose (1999: 139). This 
form of governance seeks to amend the behaviour of subjects, without challenging their 
autonomous nature (Miller & Rose, 2008: 39). By the same logic, the credit card industry 
shapes the activity of consumer-citizens by mobilizing self-entrepreneurship and self-
responsibilization without shattering their autonomy and freedom. This is achieved by 
emphasizing the securitization of identity through biometrics, based on the obligation to 
view oneself as free within neoliberal citizenship and behaving in accordance with its 
principles (Ajana, 2013: 114, 126, 127). It is a performative response, an adherence to the 
requests of “biotechno-scientific capitalist society” (Bhandar, 2004: 273), and an exercise 
of freedom that ‘keeps up’ with technological advances, and management of activities 
(Ajana, 2013: 126, 127). Securitization as a technique of the self coincides with the 
concept of neo-liberal homo œconomicus and human capital. The foundation of 
competition-based governance is when populations that consist of active economic 
subjects engage in the techniques of the self (Foucault, 2007: 183-185; 2008: 145, 282-
285). A “citizen-consumer” acts in accordance with “market principles” and continually 
engages in transactions to “maximise benefits and secure self-interests” (Ajana, 2013: 
135). Capital is not only an investment, accumulation, or exchange but an attachment to 
the entrepreneur, as he is responsible for constituting that capital and security through 
individual action (Dilts 2011: 136; Foucault, 2003: 224).  
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Foucault’s interpretation of Becker’s definition of homo œconomicus is: “the 
person who accepts reality or who responds systemically to modifications in the variables 
of the environment, appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds 
systematically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment. 
Homo œconomicus is someone who is eminently governable” (Foucault, 2008: 270). 
While Foucault (1995: 222) also states that the management and the manipulation of the 
population involves techniques that direct people to be active subjects that exercise their 
freedom in accordance with their own interests (Kristensen, 2013: 51). Based on this 
logic, the securitization of identity through biometric technology is a response to the 
environment of the industry. The articulation of it as a means of security and privilege 
mobilizes the consumer as a free and governable subject. It is an obligation to conduct 
and view oneself as free, corresponding with principles of choice and autonomy, thus it is 
also an obligation to utilize biometric technologies as an exercise of freedom (Ajana, 
2013: 129). Biometrics then framed around ‘rationalisation’ is perceived as a reasonable 
response as it permits for access and convenience, yet, this form of rationality seems to 
elicit ‘inevitably’ instead of choice (Ajana, 2013: 127); alluding to the coexistence of 
control with freedom (Foucault, 2008: 67-8). “Control, in this context is less about the 
coercive exercise of power and more about the seductive promise of additional freedom, 
privileged rights and flexible mobility. It is control in the name of freedom itself” (Ajana, 
2013: 126). Freedom then is an act of doing, a relational obligation that enables 
subjectification (Rose, 1999: 94). Simultaneously, freedom through (the securitization of 
identity) endorses apparatuses of control by instantiating citizenship claims to 
“movement, access, consumption and entrepreneurial lifestyles” (Ajana, 2013: 127). It 
	  	   22	  
enables a double function that connects “citizens and institutions and citizens and 
themselves” (Ibid: 127). It operates through the technology of the self, mobilizing 
freedom to ensure economic and security facilitation while also operating as a tool of 
governance (Foucault, 2008: 270).   
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2.3 Biometrics as a Security Apparatus and Technique of the Self 
Biometric technologies collect information from the level of the body (Rygiel, 
2010: 115). It exercises a biopolitical exchange, in which the ‘biological body’, or a 
measure of it, becomes the ‘authenticator’ (Muller, 2004: 287). Through authentication, 
identity is verified, while a separate mechanism authorizes identity for entitlement and 
access (Muller 2004: 286; Woodward et al., 2003: 3). Aas (2006) states that biometrics 
presents “a binary universe of acceptance or denial, positive or negative, right or false” 
(151). This excludes any chance of negotiation or doubt, as the ‘body does not lie’ but 
tells the truth (Aas, 2006: 151, 153). It makes it a fact that the person is the person he or 
she claims to be (Rygiel, 2010: 54). Biometric technologies function by automatically 
connecting bodies with identities, disperses biological and behavioural data across 
electronic databases, and ensures an accurate and reliable means of verifying identity and 
authenticating processes (Ajana, 2013: 3). It equates to what Foucault has mentioned as 
the “progressive animalization of man through extremely refined techniques” (Agamben, 
2004: 169). In other words, since the body itself is ‘coded’ and acts as a ‘password’ (Aas, 
2006: 143) and a ‘power relation’ (Ibid: 153) manifests as populations become subject to 
modalities of control and management (Agamben, 2004: 169; Beer, 2014). 
Ajana (2013) states, “individual identification cannot be separated from that of 
‘individual identity’” (26). Similarly, “identification as an individual is scarcely thinkable 
without categories of collective identity” (Caplan & Torpey, 2001: 3). This illustrates an 
interwoven relationship between ‘individual identification’, ‘collective membership’ and 
(consumer) citizenship obligations (Ajana, 2013: 26). Membership comprises of a 
subpopulation that is marked as belonging to a group; individuals are either identified 
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collectively by inclusion or by exclusion. Citizenship encompasses the assertion of 
membership, and with it, its rights and freedoms and duties (Ibid: 120, 129).  
It is defined as “active and individualistic, rather than passive and dependent” and the 
economic role of a consumer is integral to the membership of a citizen (Miller & Rose, 
2008: 48, 49). Citizenship is exhibited in a subject through the utilization of techniques 
that assist in achieving ‘personal fulfilment’ and ‘self-advancement’ (Miller & Rose, 
2008: 48, 82). Consumers are constituted as ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’ that pursue the 
maximization of their ‘quality of life’ through techniques of consumer choice (Ibid: 49). 
In light of this relationship between the consumer and citizen, biometric technology can 
be perceived as a technique of entrepreneurship and personal fulfilment that manifests as 
a duty of citizenship, and practice of membership. The adoption of the technology is a 
method of self-governance by its ‘self-identifying’ process; it mobilizes individuals to 
perceive their action to voluntarily verify their identity and membership as an exercise of 
choice, instead of direct governance by others (Rygiel, 2010: 132). Biometric technology 
appeals through its “parasitic vitality” (Agar, 2001: 119) and consumers will implement it 
into their lifestyle because of its promise of value. By self-identifying, the subject is 
recompensed with rights and privileges (Rygiel, 2010: 133). Through citizenship the 
constitution of identity is enabled, which facilitates the conduct of the population toward 
particular ways and means of governance (Ibid: 31). 
The function of biometric technology biologises the consumer-citizen as a homo-
oeconomicus - an economic actor; it interconnects neoliberalism and biology while 
determining identities within a biopolitical scope of governance (Ajana, 2013: 135). The 
homo-oeconomicus will attempt to ‘produce’ and ‘maximize’ his own fulfillment through 
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diverse methods and ‘technologies of the self’ (Ibid: 135). Foucault says to be an ‘ethical 
subject’ one must engage in techniques of the self, monitoring oneself not only in relation 
to future investments, but exercising one self in relation to rules of behaviour (Dilts, 
2011: 144). Correspondingly, as a citizen who performs according to obligations, a “man 
of enterprise and production” (Foucault, 2008: 271) will voluntary utilize biometrics for 
the promotion of economic freedom, and mobility (Ajana, 2013: 135). Banks, and credit 
card companies position biometric technologies to better address customer needs by 
enhancing more secure and convenient financial transactions (Engagement Bureau, 2016; 
MarketWired, 2015; PYMNT, 2017). For example, Visa’s “Future of Security Roadmap” 
highlights the use of biometrics for securing payments in Australia from 2017 to 2020 
(Burt, 2017). The approach focuses on four pillars: “devalue data by removing sensitive 
payment data from the ecosystem and making stolen account details useless; protect data 
by implementing safeguards to protect personal data as well as account details; harness 
data by identifying potential fraud before it occurs and increase confidence in approving 
good transactions and empower everyone, including accountholders and merchants, to 
play an active role in securing payments” (Visa’s Future of Security Roadmap, 2017). 
“Mobile-initiated payments are ideal for incorporating a wide range of biometrics (e.g. 
voice, face, fingerprint, iris), given the ubiquity of smartphones and the ease of 
implementation for both in-store and in-app payments. The promise of eliminating 
passwords in exchange for a more convenient biometric solution addresses a universal 
problem shared by nearly all consumers” (Ibid, 2017: 7). Visa checkout, an online 
payment service (available in many countries including Canada) uses biometrics like 
Apple Touch ID for purchases (Salisbury, 2015; Visa Checkout Terms and Service, 
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2018). This fingerprinting recognition grants consumers convenient access to make debit 
or credit card purchases online, in apps, and in stores from their phone with fingerprint 
verification in 2013 (Apple Inc, 2017; Dureval, 2017; Violino, 2015).  
Nymi™, in collaboration with TD Bank Group (TD), Royal Bank and 
MasterCard®, established a wearable credit card that verifies purchases through one’s 
heartbeat (MarketWired, 2015). Successful pilots were conducted in 2015 and 2016; 
several other banks in Canada were expected to launch similar pilots (MarketWired, 
2015). Bank of Montreal, Canada’s fourth largest lender, in partnership with MasterCard 
is the first bank to offer a biometric corporate card program - Identity Check Mobile™ in 
Canada and the United States. This allows customers to verify transactions using facial 
recognition and fingerprint when accessing online purchases (Engagement Bureau, 2016; 
Harrer, 2016). BMO customers utilize the program with an app that notifies the consumer 
when an online purchase requires verification, either by “swiping a fingerprint or 
snapping a selfie photo” (Engagement Bureau, 2016). This biometric program reduces 
the need for passwords, or makes the body a password, making digital purchases quick 
and secure (Ibid). Fujitsu, a multinational information and technology equipment 
company created an authentication process within ATMs; the customer simply places his 
palm on a device that scans the veins, which gives access to the account without any 
physical card (Fujitsu, 2012). Furthermore, Rory Pennington, Senior Analyst at Mapa 
Research states that biometrics has the potential to extend beyond basic financial 
functions as logging into a secure banking site, or conducting financial transactions. 
Since the technology records and digitizes the consumers’ identity, this allows for more 
complex services such as taking out a loan, obtaining insurance, or account onboarding 
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(Dureval, 2017). This requires banks to prioritize consumer relations; firm level auditing 
and reporting has mandated attention to “know your customer” (KYC) (Cognizant, 2013, 
1). Some banks in Europe have progressed in this area, where to facilitate new-to-bank 
onboarding processes video identification technology has been employed. The online 
bank Fidor, in partnership with IDnow (identification and electronic signature solutions), 
allows customers to on-board via video chat with display of their passport (Dureval, 
2017). Fujitsu has implemented biometric technologies for financial institutions to 
collect, analyze and authenticate documents and the identity of new applicants in less 
than five minutes (Dureval, 2017). The acceptance of biometric technology then is a 
necessary duty and act of consumer-citizenship to engage within circuits of consumption, 
an integral process that identifies members of a subpopulation for the functioning of the 
market, and an essential measure to maximize an optimal self-entrepreneurial lifestyle. 
Consumers have come to recognize the technologies not only as a requirement 
within consumerism, but now desire to utilize the technology for the purposes of ensuring 
freedom, and security. Dennis Gamiello, vice-president of identity solutions at 
MasterCard stated that the introduction of biometrics with Apple and other digital players 
helped train consumers in accepting the use of biometrics for financial services 
(Posadzki, 2016). A post-soft-launch survey of BMO biometric program customers 
discovered that: “Three of every four (74 percent) of participants strongly agree that 
biometrics are easier to use than passwords. Nine out of ten participants anticipate using 
biometrics for online payment security in the future” (Engagement Bureau, 2016). 
According to research conducted by Visa Europe on 14,000 European customers, two 
thirds of the population surveyed preferred biometrics when engaging in transactions 
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(Dureval, 2017). Furthermore, amongst the eighteen to twenty-nine age group, almost a 
quarter stated the possibility in changing banks if biometrics was not accessible to verify 
money transfers (Dureval, 2017). Another Visa survey on 1,000 Canadians states that 57 
percent of consumers perceive biometrics as faster and 65 percent say easier than 
passwords, 44 per cent state they are more secure than passwords or PINs and 86 per cent 
are interested in using biometrics to verify identity or to make payments. Canadian 
consumers are most likely to say they would trust their bank (67%) and their credit/debit 
card network (51%) to store biometric data, about half of consumers indicate that they 
would switch away from a card network, bank, or mobile phone provider that does not 
offer biometric authentication in the future (Visa, 2018). A report by Acuity Market 
Intelligence predicts that biometrics will drive a global market of 2.5 billion users with 
4.8 billion biometric devices by 2020, with revenue of 13.8 billion in 2015. Although 
biometric technologies initially progressed with governmental entities, it was expected 
that consumer and enterprise segments would become the dominant portion of the market 
by late 2017 (Violino, 2015).  
These examples illustrate how the growth of the credit card market and 
transaction infrastructure has initiated the marketing of biometrics as an efficient exercise 
of freedom, convenient apparatus for consumerism, and consumer protection technology 
(Gates, 2010: 424; MarketWired, 2015; PYMNT, 2017; Rekola, 2013: 31). With numbers 
of credit card theft and fraud increasing, the notion to protect one’s data double with 
biometric technologies appears to be a rational choice, and crucial tool for individual 
security (Gates, 2010: 424, 427). Since biometric technology is comprised of unique 
bodily and behavioural characteristics it is difficult to duplicate or fake. The risk of 
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becoming a victim of identity theft, fraud or unwanted financial activity is increased 
without it and individuals are not assured the security, or even the convenience of never 
forgetting a password without biometrics (Dureval, 2017; Rekola, 2013: 31, 35; Violino, 
2015). In comparison to PINs, usernames and passwords, biometrics actually identifies 
the customer, since it distinguishes the subject based on biological traits (Rekola, 2013: 
31). This may make consumers more inclined to use biometrics as it allows access based 
“on what they are, not what they know” (Ibid: 31). An individual who submits one’s 
body to the service of the technology to limit uncertainty and risk will also lower industry 
work volumes, and costs related to “credit card personalization, delivery, management, 
helpdesk and reissuance” (Rekola, 2013: 32), contributing to labour savings and 
economic growth (Violino, 2015). Although protection is provided by these technologies, 
the consumer population’s preference for and acceptance of biometrics predominantly 
operates for the neoliberalist agenda of consumer credit and financial services industry 
(Gates, 2010: 427). 
The institutionalization of biometrics became an apparatus for the finance 
industry to verify and track financial identities. It served the industry’s demand to 
identify, measure, and categorize the population based on its financial competences and 
levels of credit risk (Gates, 2010: 419). In the 1980s and 1990s biometrics was 
implemented by banks to control access for employees, and for “verifying the identity of 
banking customers using automated systems” (Gates, 2010: 421). Fingerprinting 
technology was adopted from law enforcement for criminal identification, and businesses 
manufacturing these technologies began to market toward access control for banking 
employees, along with customer verification procedures (Ibid: 421). In 1986, a company 
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called Identix Inc. presented the IDX-50, a smart card fitted with fingerprint technology, 
as a “useful for access-control applications,” and for “verification of credit or debit cards” 
(Ibid: 421). The finance industry emphasized the need to securitize identity due to the 
developing industry infrastructures and practices. Innovative systems of identification 
were required to better authenticate cardholder identity. For example, the “traditional 
scene of a loyal bank customer being greeted familiarly by a bank teller or branch officer 
carries more than a message of good relations…. it is also a bank’s most secure method 
of retail customer identification: direct person-to-person recognition” (Trigaux, 1982: 
29). Yet a “depersonalization” materialized within modern financial institutions, the 
‘neighborhood’ concept of customer verification no longer applied due to automation, 
expansion and convenience (Gates, 2010: 422; Trigaux, 1982: 29). As Josh Lauer (2008) 
states, the credit reporting industry began in the United States in the 1840s “to facilitate 
safe business relationships in a world increasingly inhabited by strangers,” and one of the 
most significant effects of the formation of credit reporting was the creation of the 
“disembodied financial identity” (p. 302). This intervention at the level of life creates the 
disembodied financial identity, enabling biopower in its management over the population 
(Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 266; Foucault, 1978: 143).  
The development of biometric identification was not used to correct a new issue 
involving security, nor was it solely for improving identification systems to meet the 
demands of technological and economic progressions (Gates, 2010: 422). Instead, the 
issue in “monitoring and controlling disembodied financial identities” became more 
complex along with several interrelated processes (Ibid: 422). These comprised of a 
reorganization of financial processes around computer networks, and electronic accounts, 
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and the initiative to make the Internet a profit-making apparatus. Furthermore, the 
expansion of the credit card industry and equivalency in sorting consumers into 
subpopulations of risk and value (Ibid: 422, 424). This growth of the credit card industry 
generated substantial amounts of transactional data, and the increase in credit card use 
and growing transactional infrastructure significantly increased the issue in verifying 
cardholder identity. “Whereas paying cash never required an identity check (unless there 
were restrictions on the product or service being purchased), credit card transactions were 
obviously more problematic because cards could easily be lost or stolen or obtained in 
other fraudulent ways” (Ibid: 423). Sociologist James Rule (1973) on his examination of 
the banking system in the 1970s concluded the verification of subject identity for the 
authorization of financial transactions was limited without the fingerprint, increasing the 
risk of credit card fraud (p. 265). In the mid-1980s credit card fraud grew substantially, 
costing the industry millions of dollars per year. Credit card companies like MasterCard 
began considering the use of biometrics (fingerprinting) in credit card transactions, as 
well as the eventual replacement of the plastic card with some type of electronic bodily 
identification (Ibid: 423). The future goal would be to incorporate bodies directly into the 
financial network of transactions (Ibid: 423). This convergence of the body with 
technology is what formulates citizenship practices that enact identity management, it 
actualizes biopower through the obtainment, sorting and sharing of biometric data 
(Ajana, 2013: 134; Muller, 2004; 201).  
These examples illustrate how biometrics development and wide spread 
deployment is used as an apparatus of biopower with which to govern everyday financial 
conduct (Gates, 2010: 419; Huysmans, 2006: 97). These identification systems 
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implement the function of classification in that specific subpopulations are ‘marked’ 
holders of ‘a surplus of rights’ (Balibar, 2002: 83). As Muller (2004) states, biometrics is 
an act of citizenship that authenticates identity for “access to rights, bodies, spaces and so 
forth” (280). It allows for the exercise of privilege, and authorization of access (Aas, 
2006: 150). Biometrics then can be perceived as an act of freedom that epitomizes 
citizenship, since it enables financial mobility and self-maximizing choices (Ong, 2006: 
501) that coincide with neoliberalism values of autonomy, governance, and 
entrepreneurship (Miller & Rose, 2008: 48). As Isin (2004, 220) states the “formation of 
a subject…is not simply an object of or subject to governmental projects but is governed 
through its freedom.” Freedom allows access, yet it is also continually assessed for 
conduct that is a threat to the “autonomous exercise of freedom and mobility” (van 
Munster, 2005: 5). Based on this logic, the technology provides the ability to divide the 
population into subgroups, designating others more desirable than others (Rygiel, 2010: 
49). In fact, it has the power to reject certain subpopulations (Byrne, 2007). Those, who 
refuse to engage in biometrics are categorised as risky, (Rygiel 2010: 132, 133) thus they 
potentially renounce their responsibilities as citizen-consumers and can be excluded from 
access to resources (Ajana, 2013: 129). For example, financial processes, including 
access to online banking or more complex financial operations may be denied, 
transactions may not be feasible with cash, cheque, or with the use of a credit card alone 
without biometric integration (Gates, 2010: 425; Dureval, 2017). Inequality, as a result of 
choice, materializes through groups of inclusion and exclusion; there are no rights or 
entitlements without individual responsibilities (Ericson et al., 2000: 555). This 
inadequate exercise of freedom equates the subpopulation as undesirable, a threat that 
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requires containment. The objective then is to enable freedom for the desirable citizen 
population (Ajana, 2013: 129; Foucault, 1978: 256; Rygiel, 2010: 103).  
 Foucault states citizenship as an apparatus of biopolitics enhances the life of 
desirable populations (Rygiel, 2010: 100). Thus, the biopolitical relationship between 
biometrics and the consumer-citizen enhances the life of individuals as members of the 
desirable population. Yet, this relationship enables the ‘calibration of the individual body 
to the species body – requirements of the economy’ (Isin, 2004: 221). Calibration brings 
consumer life into the “realm of calculation,” (Rygiel, 2010: 113) in other words the 
adoption of biometrics not only produces a productive population and enhances the life of 
the consumer-citizen, but also functions for the whole economic condition of the credit 
card industry. In other words, biometrics, although a technique of the self, is “integrated 
into structures of coercion or domination” (Foucault, 1993: 23). Through a technique of 
domination one “has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination 
of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts 
upon himself” (Ibid: 23). These two techniques in collaboration exert how individuals, 
are governed by others, by governing themselves (Ibid: 23). Since biometrics effectively 
governs at a distance, institutions are able to remain far removed from the choices of 
others, yet maintain a governing position (Aas, 2006: 152) by managing the movement 
and constitution of populations (Ericson, et al., 2000: 533; Rygiel, 2010: 119). This 
translates to the gathering and storage of personal information into databases (Rygiel, 
2010: 124), monitoring and controlling consumers’ access to transactional systems and 
financial activity, and sorting subpopulations according to levels of value and risk (Ajana, 
2013: 134; Gates, 2010: 423, 424, 428). This extraction of knowledge constitutes 
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populations as more governable through the division of the population (Rygiel, 2010: 
124). The widening of the gap between the desirable and undesirable subpopulations 
allows the former group to facilitate growth of capital while optimizing quality of life; 
while the latter is classified into forms of exclusion (Foucault, 1978: 142-3; Foucault, 
2003: 32-33; 254-5; Foucault, 2007: 11-20; Rygiel, 2010: 105, 124; van Munster, 2005: 
6).  
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2.4 Risk Categorization, Choice, and the Responsibilization of the Consumer 
The development of biometric technology along with computerized informational 
networks allow for the increasingly automation of data collection and analysis for the 
purposes of calculating the economic value and risk of consumer subpopulations (Ajana, 
2013: 165; Zwick and Knott, 2009: 234, 235). Marketization and consumerization has 
created a “disembodied mass of financial data” (Gates, 2010: 429) from everyday flows, 
transactions and activities, which pervade risk. This has increased the use of techniques 
of evaluation, the continuous monitoring and cost-benefit analyses that identify threats, 
and reduce and neutralize them (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 268; Rose, 1999: 240; 
Rose, 2000: 324). The 1950s and 1960s birthed an innovation of mass consumer credit, 
broadening the scope and potentialities of consumer choice and consumption. The credit 
card industry adopted a new way of “managing consumers as a population rather than as 
individual subjects” (Marron, 2007: 108). Statisticians and consultants commissioned 
technologies like statistical credit scoring to determine creditworthiness; it calculates the 
measure of productiveness and identification of risk of the consumer-citizen (Marron, 
2007: 104, 110; Miller & Rose, 2008: 37). This statistical expertise became applied for 
the purposes of understanding and acting upon consumer populations as risks (Marron, 
2007: 124). Lenders were given a new means of governing consumers, the control of 
financial movement through the use of an objective, scientific, and empirical scoring 
model that established norms of risk against which the consumer population would be 
measured (Ibid: 104).  
This type of intervention was sanctioned under legislation as a way of ensuring 
equal opportunity within the market, based on a subject’s competence for self-
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government (Marron, 2007: 104) - corresponding with neoliberalist concepts of laissez-
faire and homo œconomicus. Access to circuits of consumption and financial conduct is 
made conditional as certain points need to be passed in order for individuals to access the 
benefits of regulated financial freedom and liberty (Rose, 1999: 243). “Rights and 
benefits are contingent upon individual market performance” (Ong, 2006: 500) “and by 
fixing identity in terms of biological characteristics” (Ajana, 2013: 135). In other words, 
self-governance is implemented through the infusion of capitalism and biology (via 
biometrics) under biopolitical governance (Ibid: 135). This infuses prudency in those who 
wish to achieve this level of freedom through the active calculation of their conduct, 
which simultaneously refines the standards for inclusion, and produces varying forms of 
exclusion (Rose, 1999: 243; Rose, 2000: 324, 327). Balibar (2004) states “every 
institution of citizenship involves the institutionalization of exclusions, following 
different modalities” (76, 68). Surveillance automizes data through technologies like 
biometrics and computer databases (Lyon, 2003a, chap 3). These technologies are used 
because of risks and the inclination to manage populations (Lyon, 1993, 20). Risk-
profiling techniques corresponding with biometrics technologies construct classifications 
of exclusions (Rygiel, 2010: 120). The purpose is to more effectively manage populations 
because of the individualization of risk that emerged with the rise of neoliberalism, and 
the requirement to “continuously calibrate the individual self-identities with institutional 
ones” (Rygiel, 2010: 119). Credit is then based on the financial identity of the consumer 
and the individualized choices that affect accountability, performance, and risk-
management (Lauer, 2008: 305). This is determined through the behaviour, probabilities, 
and the calculated competency and culpability of the consumer and those in a similar 
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“risk pool” (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 267; Marron, 2007: 124). For example, 
private insurance firms are refining their standards of risk amongst their customer 
population; this ensures self-responsibilization of the customer and excludes the costly 
(Ericson, et al., 2000: 555). Exclusion has two divisions, namely, those who are 
categorized as risky yet are still incorporated through a “principle of activity” (Rose, 
1999: 240) and those who are “anti-citizens” (Ibid: 240), that is, the subpopulation that is 
rejected from circuits of credit consumption due to their incompetence to defend against 
risks (Marron, 2007: 124-125). All groups are responsibilized in a sense; the excluded 
however exercise their irresponsibility through a choice and action of freedom that results 
in failure - the responsibility of the risky (van Munster, 2005: 6). Yet the risky are able to 
“re-attach to circuits of civility” through rational, self-governing behaviour (Rose, 1999: 
240). In other words, those defined as risky but still incorporated are not excluded from 
all markets, resources, avenues etc. They are still able to engage in circuits of 
consumption, however their categorization of risk, their level of responsibilization, 
depicts the level of freedom in consumerism. Marron (2007) states “they are thus made 
responsible for their own capacity as consumers, for the consuming costs and horizons of 
opportunity implicit in their individualized projects of consumption” (124). Also, as Rose 
(1999) states “conditional access to circuits of consumption and civility”, is based on the 
“constant scrutiny of the rights of individuals to access certain kinds of flows of 
consumption goods” (243). There are no rights or entitlements without individual 
responsibilities (Ericson et al., 2000: 555), thus, certain goods, credit etc. are dependent 
on inclusion or level of exclusion, which is determined through the continuous 
monitoring of the individuals’ capacity and action of responsibilization. In this sense, 
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management over the population is flexible (Rygiel, 2010: 66); because it allows and 
controls for circulations and movement to take place, and shifts between the good and the 
bad (Foucault, 2007: 66).  
It is through (consumer) citizenship that biopolitics constructs the included from 
the excluded; as subjects are responsible in understanding the distinction between high 
and low risk behaviours and resulting consequences (Rygiel, 2010: 28, 67). Risk pricing 
is based on the creditworthiness of the consumer, the probability of consumer non-
payment on a loan, and if the cost associated with the availability of credit surpasses the 
cost of risky behaviour (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 268, Marron, 2007: 103-104). 
For example, variables like “income, property, education and employment” dictate a 
subject’s capacity and probability of non-payment (Marron, 2007: 112). Thus, 
‘deserving’ consumers pay less while ‘underserving’ consumers’ pay more (Makuch 
2001: 16). Subjects who were previously excluded for their attribution of risk may ‘re-
attach’, although with higher credit card interest rates, while subjects with low-risk are 
offered more credit at a lowered cost, ensuring compensation “for the differential costs of 
default presented by differential categories of risk” (Marron, 2007: 122). This enables the 
potentiality for more consumption, and ultimately market growth (Edelberg 2003: 20-1; 
Johnson 1992: 28; Liñares-Zegarra and Wilson, 2012: 2, 5; White, 2004: 503-4). The 
emphasis on prudentialism for the regulation of risk is a mechanism of biopower. It 
implicates the whole consumer population to pragmatically calculate risk within 
individual behaviour, as risk is calculable only when spread throughout a population 
(Ewald, 1991: 203; Reith, 2004: 395). To ascertain risk, a probabilistic analysis measures 
known factors in the past (recursiveness of events), to determine future contingencies of 
	  	   39	  
default. A level of certainty and predictability based on consistencies and patterns is 
integrated into more complex assumptions of risk for defining the profitability of a 
consumer (Liñares-Zegarra and Wilson, 2012: 5; Marron, 2007: 104, 110, 118, 121; 
Reith, 2004: 395). Different types of risk scoring enable different measures to identify 
risk; risk-based pricing consists of the FICO credit score; unpaid credit card debt (short-
term and outstanding) (Liñares-Zegarra and Wilson, 2012: 3). The FICO credit score 
changed the aspect of risk from analyzing only discontinuous variables within a confined 
population of a creditor’s customer inventory into analyzing standardized, continuous 
measures of risk compared with the national customer population (Marron, 2007: 117). 
Application scoring determines acceptance or rejection, along with the type of 
conditions/interest rate administered. Behavioural scoring continually monitors the 
performance of the subject in order to determine the renewal of a credit card account, 
credit limits, and targeted marketing (Marron, 2007: 117; Ong, 2006: 500). Risk pricing, 
as an overall process can be perceived as a biopolitical tool of governance. It functions 
through regularization; it manages fluctuations by rendering the population amenable for 
economic growth (Foucault, 1978: 142-3; Foucault, 2007: 11- 20, 47). Profit is the 
objective, and its probability is conceived upon the self-governance of the consumer 
population, as they are held accountable for their consuming costs and optimization of 
opportunities (Marron, 2007: 124). Conceivability of a future threat is within the confines 
of human action; the subject is autonomous in the construction of their own trajectory and 
stabilization of outcomes by recognizing and responding to the mediation of risks (Reith 
2004: 396). In other words, this process individualizes responsibility for the potentiality 
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to consume (Marron, 2007: 111); it organizes and produces subpopulations in risk 
hierarchies, which ultimately limits or expands consuming capabilities (Reith, 2004: 385  
This continuous regulative control over subpopulations can be represented 
through modulation (Rose, 2000: 325), as Deleuze states, through coded language 
individuals are not created, but endlessly sub-divisible “dividuals” through the gathering 
of personal data depicting recursiveness of events and choices (Deleuze, 1992: 5). They 
are not subjects with an inherently fixed character, but with competences and 
potentialities that are transformed into codes, profiles, security ratings etc. Subjects are a 
coded assortment of information based on “credentials, activities, and qualifications for 
entry into this or that network” (Rose, 1999: 234; Rose, 2000: 325). It is not a mechanism 
that seeks to socialize or discipline subjects under the panopticised surveillance of a 
permanent individualized gaze. Instead this represents a form of biopolitical surveillance, 
in which activity is monitored through the flows imbedded within everyday life and 
restructured by logics innate within networks (Ibid: 234; Ibid: 325). This production of 
the dividual, the multiplication of ‘data subjects’ (or data doubles), the risk score and 
profit probability, signifies a cybernetic2 relationship between consumers and biopolitical 
networks. Information machines continuously collect data to identify, and discriminate 
individuals into categorized subpopulation profiles (Elmer, 2004:41). Enacting a type of 
control and governance that seeks to regulate behaviour across the population to ensure 
maximum efficiency and minimization of the negative as a whole (Feeley & Simon, 
1992: 452; Foucault, 2007: 70-74; Rose, 1999: 234; Rose, 2000: 325). Biopolitics is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “the study of human control functions and of mechanical and electronic systems 
designed to replace them, involving the application of statistical mechanics to 
communication engineering” (Dictionary.com, n.d). 	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focused in achieving this state of balance through controlling random occurrences by 
predicting the plausibility, or compensate for the effects of it (Foucault, 2003: 249) 
Deleuze states control (e.g. of risk, as in the case with credit card companies) occurs 
within internal processes of digital networks, it is analyzed and managed not through 
“static media and fixed architectures, but by ‘codes’” (Zwick & Knott, 2009: 235). Codes 
are flexible in nature and function, they identify and simulate in ways that fixed 
enclosures cannot (Bogard, 2007). They also can be reconfigured to revise assessments of 
value, risk, and adjust access (Zwick & Knott, 2009: 235). For example, Guattari’s (in 
Deleuze, 1992: 7) explanation of control, “one would be able to leave one’s apartment, 
one’s street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a 
given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between 
certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s 
position – licit or illicit – and effects a universal modulation”. Thereby, the continuous 
extraction and measurement of consumer data bits into new formations of risk that 
determine profitability is a modular effect that breaks down life, and conceptualizes it as 
a code (Zwick & Knott, 2009: 235, 236). It is precisely biopower that enables this 
governance over the population by mobilizing characteristics that render the consumer-
citizen visible and knowable in order to attain particular objectives (Marron, 2007: 119; 
Foucault, 1994: 221; Rabinow & Rose, 1994, xi). 
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2.5 The Biopolitical Manufacturing of the Consumer through Biometrics and the Data 
Double  
Foucault (2003) states that biopower emerges when it becomes technologically 
feasible for man to manage life, particularly with surveillance apparatuses and tactics of 
human control. This can be illustrated through Haggerty & Ericson’s term of the 
‘surveillant assemblage,’ it operates by extracting bodies from territorial spaces, and 
recoding consumer activity into distinct flows and virtual data doubles which can be 
analyzed and targeted for intervention (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 606). Negroponte 
(1995) states that ‘being digital’ is the alteration of the physical, into electronically 
produced bits and bytes. These digital traces of our life become an economic advantage 
when they not only are identified, but also analyzed, sorted and distributed (Dodge & 
Kitchen, 2005: 855; Zwick & Knott, 2009: 228). Biometrics is meant to authenticate 
identification by matching data with a specific person (Cavoukian, 1999: 3). Biometric 
technology is “an identifier”: “it does not define a person’s identity or who they are, 
rather it links specific data with that person” (ibid). If biometrics only verified 
identification of a person through the measurement of the body, then it would not be a 
biopolitical tool (van der Ploeg, 1999b: 40), yet as a biopolitical tool, it provides a ‘raw’ 
instantaneous truth extracted from the body, which is processed into a ‘refined’ truth for 
specific political objectives (Aas, 2006: 154; Ajana, 2013: 91-92, 102; Ruppert, 2011: 
226).  
This refined truth or knowledge is the breakdown of everyday activities into bits 
of information (dividual), for purposes of management and profit (Dodge & Kitchin, 
2005: 857; Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 619). Transactional data tracks the movement, 
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behaviour and performance of subpopulations and biometrics binds this data to the 
subject by verifying and authenticating identity (Ruppert, 2011: 221). These surveillance 
practices fall under the pretext that they are for the biopolitical well-being of the 
population; they are ‘efficient and technologically neutral,’ yet they operate to 
“camouflage” the discriminatory politics they enable (Hunt & Rygiel, 2006; Rygiel, 
2010: 129). Instead of removing partiality, biometric, risk profiling and data mining 
technologies reduce the discriminatory process as more “technical and scientific” 
(Rygiel, 2010: 129). In other words, the utilization of codes i.e. fingerprints, 
characteristics, profiles, credit score, etc (Aas, 2006: 155; Rose, 1999: 234) involved in 
these technologies is not neutral (Curry, 2004; Lyon, 2003a, 2003b; Rygiel, 2010: 129). 
The quick, routine monitoring, updating and analyses of codes, and their ability to 
provide authentication to grant access enable the power to discriminate (Dodge & 
Kitchin, 2005: 855). This renders the population governable by ‘social sorting’ through 
‘digital discrimination’, which subsequently affects the life-chances of individuals 
(Curry, 2004; Lyon, 2003a, 2003b; Rygiel, 2010: 129). Together, these bio-technological 
techniques of surveillance conceptualize Deleuze and Guattari’s (1992) ‘double 
assemblage,’ as their harmony derives from the fact that they function unanimously 
(Patton, 1994: 158; Huysmans, 2006: 97). Biometric technology is actualised in the 
‘machinic’ assemblage as it enables the identification of subpopulations and allows for 
interconnected databases of credit card and marketing companies (Bogard, 2006: 105). It 
is the material and data that facilitate the distributions of the data double and flows of 
information entailing consumption and production across networks (Bogard, 2006: 105; 
Zwick & Knott, 2009: 229). The ‘enunciative’ assemblage is where risk, claims and truth 
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statements are defined and produced, in so that varying levels of value are attached to the 
data double (Bogard, 2006: 105). Essentially, the consumer population has been 
transformed into a digital assemblage, an assemblage, in which a subpopulation exists 
and obtains meaning (Zwick & Knott, 2009: 229). In other words, biometric technologies 
transform human identity into patterns of information that produce new formations of 
identity (Aas, 2006: 144). The process is an ‘informatization of the body,’ in which flows 
of information translated into digital codes alter the identity of the person and its 
conceptualization (Rygiel, 2010: 145; van der Ploeg, 2003: 24, 58, 64) 
Biometrics and transactional data has the potential to violate privacy measures as 
it directly affects one’s ability to decide and control the use of their data (Alterman, 2003: 
145; Ruppert, 2011: 219). Privacy is a “claim of individuals, groups or institutions to 
determine when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others” (Westin, 1967: 7). Security and privacy issues related to the storage of biometric 
data along with other identifying data is a concern (Rekola, 2013: 33), particularly that 
financial companies are objectivizing, merging and sharing personal information with 
disparate, disembedded systems and databases (Marron, 2008: 24). Haggerty & Ericson 
(2000) state that the surveillant assemblage transforms the institution of privacy by 
surpassing institutional boundaries when its intent to “serve one purpose finds other uses” 
(p. 606, 616). ‘Function creep’ refers to technology being used beyond its intended 
purposes (European Commission, 2005: 16) when, for example, the functional purpose of 
biometric technology leads to the manipulation of its system and exploits the capabilities 
of data mining 3 (Ajana, 2013: 47). Another similar term is ‘knowledge discovery,’ this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The analysis of peoples behaviour to establish profiles (Dodge & Kitchin, 2005: 876)	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occurs when data mining techniques discover new aggregate knowledge, often 
independent of the subject’s consent. Individuals may not even be aware that this data 
exists, or that it is being used, analyzed, manipulated, and sold (Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, 2014). The objective of knowledge discovery is to unveil 
patterns from people’s behaviour, when used within financial services it “affects the life 
chances of millions in terms of credit scoring”, and it also is used to “channel particular 
goods, services, information, opportunities, and life chances to some people and not 
others” (Dodge & Kitchen, 2005: 876). What is stored about an individual is “constitutive 
and inseparable from who that person is” (Ajana, 2013: 14), and with respect to van der 
Ploeg (2003) this calls for an imperative reconsideration of the effects of invasive forms 
of monitoring, classifying, and analysing and effectively ‘controlling and manipulating’ 
populations through the interventions on the body and generation of identities (70-1). 
Alterman (2003) states this bodily ‘representation’ throughout systems and databases 
causes privacy loss and damages the self-respect of individuals (143). In accordance with 
Kant’s ultimate moral principle - one should treat humanity only as ends in themselves, 
never as a means (Kant, Schneewind, Baron & Kagan, 2002) - Alterman (2003) positions 
that the utilization of a person’s body as a means to an end is analogous in obliging that 
person to surrender his body and with it, his ‘free will’ (p. 145).  
Through the activity of a subject (biometrics and transactional data) (Ruppert, 
2011: 227) a ‘metaphysical piece of yourself’ is surrendered (Alterman, 2003: 143). In 
other words, the actions of subjects permit for the ‘enactment of population objects’ 
(Ruppert, 2011: 227), it grants others to use your identifying data for their own 
objectives, and potential misuse of data, which makes it difficult to maintain control over 
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(Alterman, 2003: 143, 144, 145), challenge, or intercede in the production and circulation 
of their data double (Ruppert, 2011: 227). Furthermore, the threat to privacy and security 
is greater with biometrics since it is stable, offers greater certainty than other identifying 
data alone, and cannot be changed (Alterman, 2003: 145, 146; Rekola, 2013: 50). As 
Boutin states, in relation to the collection and sharing of information, “it is practically 
impossible for anyone to find all the information being passed around about themselves, 
or to correct it” (2016). The circulation of the data double through a multitude of 
differing ‘centres of calculation’ operate for services and power that are generally 
unknown to the subject (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 613). This loss of control, and 
objectification of the body and determinability of identity through these identifying 
technologies creates a sense of ‘alienation’ from one’s body (Alterman, 2003: 146). The 
identifying process does not merely uncover subjects as already shaped and fixed, but 
instead it ‘produces’ their identities and particular abilities (Ruppert, 2011: 224). As 
Foucault (1983) states, “a subject is not to be subjected (connoting disciplinary power) 
but to be subjectified” (Ruppert, 2011: 224). In other words, data subjects are produced 
through other actors that determine their identity and classification (Ruppert, 2011: 224). 
Furthermore, this classification of the data subject is constructed and projected with a 
measure of value, alluding to Muniesa, Milo & Callon’s (2007) ‘economic agencement’, 
it is the process whereby ‘things, behaviours and processes’ are rendered ‘economic’ (3). 
As Dodge & Kitchen (2005) state, this economic identity, that they refer to as ‘capta 
shadow’ is produced through the behaviours and transactions of individuals, and have 
become ‘valuable, tradable commodities’ as demonstrated by the growth of “credit 
	  	   47	  
reference agencies, lifestyle profiles, and geodemographic systems4”; yet individuals lack 
the ability to control the constitution of it, or its use (Dodge & Kitchen, 2005: 859). 
Essentially, the acceptance of biometric technology and engaging in the production of the 
data double renders the consumer population transparent, and subjectified, with limited 
power; it enables credit card companies to exercise biopower by acquiring control of 
consumers’ bodies, and tracking and differentiating the population as measurable 
commodities. 
Biopolitics is drawn to a cybernetic conception, associated with multiplicative 
practices involving the “formation, coding, de-coding, and algorithms,” of networks of 
data (Dillon & Reid, 2001: 65). Information resulting from flows of the surveillant 
assemblage is constructed for “governance, commerce and control” (Haggerty & Ericson, 
2000: 613). Subjects invoke copious amounts of identity markers through the body’s 
movements and locations. Successions and patterns enable the accumulation of data 
towards a particular configuration of a person (Ajana, 2013: 19, 134; Whitson & 
Haggerty, 2008: 574). Once a subject is identified, this unit can be acted upon, processed 
in a manner that clusters them with other similar units to suit particular purposes (Coll, 
2013: 204; Dodge & Kitchin, 2004: 853). Essentially, the power to monitor and define 
nearly all consumption and non-consumption behaviours of consumers facilitates the 
production of consumer identities (Zwick & Knott, 2009: 227). Identity, produced 
through codes by mathematical algorithms occurs in data-processing systems such as 
banks and marketing companies (Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 165-6; Dodge & Kitchen, 2004: 
853, Zwick & Knott, 2009: 234). Billions of transactions are recorded each day, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  “Study of the population and its characteristics, divided according to regions on a 
geographical basis” (mbskool.com).	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produce comprehensive records of times, date and location of transaction (Dodge & 
Kitchin, 2004: 853). These transactions in themselves are an ‘identity check’, they 
document i.e. what a person reads, choice in drink and play, travels, etc. (Gates, 2010: 
423; Turow, 1997: 44). They indicate a “person’s behaviour, health, consumption 
activity” (Whitson & Haggerty: 574), and “habits, preferences, and lifestyles” (Haggerty 
& Ericson, 2000: 611). It unveils clusters of associations amongst “demographic, 
attitudinal, behavioural, and geographical features of a population” (Turow, 1997: 44). 
Each access to a privilege creates another entry into a database; a further marker toward 
the data double that facilitates a constant reproduction, and revision of an individual’s 
score (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 611, 613; Rose, 2000: 326; Ruppert, 2011: 223, 226; 
Whitson & Haggerty, 2008: 574; Zwick and Knott, 2009: 235). The use of the data 
double is a valuable commodity that enables unlimited social sorting of consumer 
populations into governable categories of value and risk (Dodge & Kitchen, 2005: 859; 
Gates, 2010: 423-424; Stalder and Lyon, 2003: 90; Zwick & Knott, 2009: 222, 224). 
Lyon (2003b, 1) states “surveillance today sorts people into categories, assigning worth 
or risk, in ways that have real effects on their life chances.” Surveillance categorizes 
populations into groups for inclusion and exclusion (Lyon, 1993, 20) through 
technologies that automize data, i.e. biometrics and risk profiling (Lyon 2003a, chap 3). 
These technologies enable a “social sorting” through “digital discrimination” (Rygiel, 
2010: 129). Illustrating a biopolitical surveillance that seeks to control and manage 
subpopulations by ‘textualizing’ or reducing identities by mere personal details (Lauer, 
2008: 301; Lyon, 2003a: 5). The textualization of identities dates back to mercantile 
agencies in the late 19th century, Lauer (2008) states the system identified, categorized, 
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predicted and valuated persons as economic subjects for commodification and 
distribution purposes (p. 304, 323). This imperfect representation of the textualized, 
enumerated financial identity created consequential affects for the individual, and still 
remains today (Gates, 2010: 424; Lauer, 2008: 320, 321).  
Credit-card firms are selling consumer credit card transactional data to marketing, 
advertising companies, and data brokers5, yet they do not inform consumers, for fear of 
repercussion (Kaye, 2013). These technologies are efficient and cost-effective processes 
that are not inhibited by obstructions of space and time that are inherent within physical 
surveillance. They do not require excessive labour, they are inconspicuous, and they are 
stable (Rose, 2000: 326; Ruppert, 2011: 221). Venture Development Center acts as an 
intermediary amongst data brokers and brands and data suppliers, the company stated the 
majority of credit card companies engage in data monetization6 (Kaye, 2013). The 
sharing of data-collecting practices between private companies enables governance over 
populations, controlling mobility and access (Rygiel, 2010: 78). The American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), an advocacy group for the privacy rights of Americans, 
describes that a “major factor driving the trend toward data surveillance forward is the 
commodification of personal information by corporations” (Stanley & Steinhardt, 2003: 
4; ACLU, 2004). Private corporations are not accountable to citizens nor do they 
accurately portray their representation. Therefore, their increasing participation in 
monitoring the activities of subjects fosters concerns over the issues of responsibility, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “Data brokers are companies that collect personal information about consumers from a 
variety of public and non-public sources and resell the information to other companies” 
(The Federal Trade Commission, 2012). 
6 “Data Monetization can be defined as maximizing the revenue potential from available 
data by institutionalizing the capture, storage, analysis and effective dissemination of that 
data” (Zimmermann, 2011).	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access and possession of data (Rygiel, 2010: 78). In 2011, Mastercard Advisors 
developed an Information Services sector that approached media-agency trading desks 
with an appealing offer: data entailing purchases of 80 billion consumers (Kaye, 2013). 
Mastercard joined Maxpoint, a digital-ad firm that aggregates publicly available data 
such as health data, to distinguish population characteristics within particular ZIP code 
regions (Kaye, 2013). Maxpoint then “sells display, mobile and video ads”, which 
contain targeted coupons, or store offers on behalf of CPG – Consumer Packaged 
Groups, and other forms of advertisers i.e. restaurants (Kaye, 2013). Essentially, a pizza 
joint may utilize the classification system to push promotions in areas where populations 
engage in more fast-food transactions (Kaye, 2013). Mastercard also disperses segmented 
transactional data through Exelate, a data-management company that converts 
information from Mastercard and other associate companies “including Acxiom and 
Nielsen into digital-ad exchanges for targeting” (Kaye, 2013; Out-Law, 2011). This 
targets subpopulations more likely to shop at particular stores (Kaye, 2013). American 
Express transforms transactional data into income through its Business Insights 
consulting sector, which has targeted mail and online proposals to consumers on behalf of 
advertisers on an aggregate level (Kaye, 2013). Visa also sorts consumers into cohorts 
based on different factors, including purchasing history and location, before selling the 
data to marketing companies (Out-Law, 2011; Reisinger, 2011). The company has a 
patented application that uses credit account transaction data to target digital ads. The 
profile generator even contains non-transactional data i.e. address, online information 
from social media, google searches, credit bureaus, insurance claims and even DNA 
databanks (Lowcards.com, 2012). This is a “systematic modulation of the consumer 
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population,” as personal information is continually updated, mined, and distributed 
(Zwick & Knott, 2009: 223). This makes subpopulations knowable and calculable in 
relation to a product. It “creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and 
accumulates new bodies of information;” (Foucault, 1980: 52) producing categorizing 
practices that generate profiles of limited or expanded access (Dodge & Kitchin, 2005: 
878; Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 175; Gates, 2010: 423-424; Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 613, 
615; Rose, 1999: 245; Ruppert, 2011: 221-222).  
Lyon (1993, 23) explains, “the assessments and judgements made on data subjects 
depend on coded criteria, and it is these codes that make surveillance processes work in 
particular ways.” To demonstrate this, Lyon (2003b) states that surveillance technologies 
are contingent upon classification programs that are constructed around searchable 
databases. Marketing companies for example, use these classification programs to 
organize and sort consumer populations into different groups (p. 14). As aforementioned, 
this coding is not neutral because it exposes deductions and calculations that are made 
about these populations in a manner that labels them. This process then effects the 
decisions regarding the offering of products and services to varying populations (Rygiel, 
2010: 129). Lyon (2002, 1) denotes this as the “phenetic fix;” used “to capture personal 
data triggered by human bodies and to use these abstractions to place people in new 
social classes of income, attributes, habits, preferences, or offences, in order to influence, 
manage or control them.” This discriminatory process is illustrated in the manufacturing 
process of the consumer score through informational characteristics and narratives. The 
consumer score, or profile is a computer-generated number that denotes a specific total to 
a consumer, its perceived economic value for a particular commodity, or toward an area 
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of consumption (Zwick & Knott, 2009: 233-234). It is similar to FICO credit scores, yet 
they are not regulated as to what factors may not be used, nor is their regulation in the 
transparency or accuracy of the score (Boutin, 2016). Like a FICO score, a consumer 
score ascertains risk and value through probabilities on known factors and may save 
businesses large costs i.e. save insurers the costs of undercharging a risky client (Boutin, 
2016). Although, these scores can negatively affect certain subpopulations, it may affect 
potential careers, schools, insurance, etc. and potentially create secrete blacklists (Boutin, 
2016). Data brokers like Acxiom purchase data from credit card companies and gather 
more identifying data from other sources. Derived data elements infer certain 
characteristics of a subject, and patterns of correlations, i.e. location data and purchasing 
data may reveal race or health status through algorithms (Boutin, 2016; Cheney-Lippold, 
2011: 165, 175; Federal Trade Commission, 2014: 19). For example, health insurance 
may reject to cover for an individual because of their unhealthy food choices indicated by 
transactions; this infers the subject is obese with increased health issues (Coll, 2013: 
211). Information may entail gender, class, race, sexual orientation; illnesses like HIV 
and depression, or histories of substance abuse, which is then sold to clientele (Boutin, 
2016; Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 165). As Curry (2004) states certain narratives state that 
“people who are in spatial proximity with one another are associated one with another… 
people do things that are like those done by people with whom they associate” (494). In 
other words, ‘flawed’ or undesirable subpopulations are thereby made known and 
discriminated against through the constraint of options (Lyon, 1994: 154). Giorgio 
Agamben’s (2004) refers to these processes of identification as “biopolitical tatoos,” 
where bodies are marked and grouped as good or bad citizens (p. 169). As a mechanism 
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of control, these practices of identification regulate the amount of freedom permissible 
for particular subpopulations (Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 166; Huysmans, 2006: 97). They 
represent a knowledge constructed on a ‘one-way observation,’ (Aas, 2006: 153) that 
enables a regulatory mechanism that intervenes in the embodied existence and lives of 
persons. Opening or closing possible encounters, i.e. access to circuits of consumption, 
treatment and benefits, and mobility for varying groups (Ajana, 2013: 75, 92; Dillon & 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 266; Dillon & Reid, 2001: 48, 57; Dodge & Kitchin, 2005: 853; 
Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 618; Rose, 1999: 243; Rose, 2000: 326).  
Through biometrics, the body materializes as instantaneous ‘truth’. The purpose is 
not only to obtain information about the identity of subjects, but also to manufacture 
identities (Aas, 2006: 154). As Van der Ploeg (1999a) states that identifying technologies 
do not necessarily identify a pre-existing identity, but function as a means of establishing 
an identity (300). It is a conceptualization of the data double through the “tentacles of the 
surveillant assemblage”, the reduction of the “flesh to pure information’ (Haggerty & 
Ericson, 2000: 613). Many attributes of a score/profile are accurate, although data can  
be further manipulated, and ‘partial’ or ‘underdetermined’ identities are produced for 
manufacturing purposes and economic value (Boutin, 2016; Zwick & Knott, 2009: 233). 
Sunil Gupta, analytics expert at Insight, explains the function of the score from the 
viewpoint of the economics of customer production. 
 “For our clients, it’s of course important to know who is likely to respond 
to their message and buy their products. For them, talking to someone 
who won’t buy their products, no matter what, is a big waste. So, they 
come to us to tell them which is which by ranking thousands of 
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individuals according to a model we prepare for the client. Each individual 
gets a score and then we provide the client with deciles to make it easier 
for them to compare the different segments of the market for their specific 
product. Our database is huge, so we believe we can really parcel out the 
true scores for each member of the population we look at and the client 
has a lot of confidence in the targets and non-targets we provide them 
with” (Zwick & Knott, 2009:233).  
This process targets and manufactures consumers as ‘valuable information commodities’ 
through the collection, analysis, categorization and sharing/selling of personal 
information, depicting a modular simulation that controls customers, while creating 
economic growth (Zwick & Knott, 2009: 224, 238, 239). This assemblage of the 
population as commodities and potentialities illustrates Foucault’s teaching of biopolitics; 
it is the extraction of life’s ‘vital signs’ to use them for promotion and exploitation 
(Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; 273). As Thacker (2005) states, information in 
biopolitics is that which is, and produces, the material, the biological and embodiment of 
“life itself” (p. 28). Here, life becomes dispersed, “weighed and valued”, a biopolitical 
approach that “capitalizes life” by “regulating the contingent economy of species life” 
(Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 268). Foucault’s focus was not in how establishments, 
governments, and knowledge operate in their own sake, but instead, how they work in 
relation to the ‘making of subjects’ (Foucault, 1994: 126-127). This capitalization and 
commodification process that ‘makes up subjects’ illustrates how surveillant apparatuses 
enable a subjectification of the subject, an operation over the population that functions as 
a ‘means to an end’. Rather than being an accurate or inaccurate depiction of subjects, the 
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surveillant assemblage pragmatically enables institutions to discriminate populations 
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 614). A ‘digital discrimination’ implemented through the use 
of  “computer codes, algorithms and narratives” (Rygiel, 2010:132). That segregates 
consumer subpopulations into functional hierarches, presenting those that exemplify 
more value from less value for a particular product, marketing message etc. (Zwick & 
Knott, 2009: 234). An exercise of biopower that renders the consumer population 
manageable through ‘caesuras,’ a fragmentation within the whole population that exploits 
the biological continuum of life (Foucault, 2003: 254-5). In other words, the 
constructions of categories that make up people (Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 173; Zwick & 
Knott, 2009: 241), ‘loci’s of inclusion and exclusion’ (Rose, 1999: 243), illustrate a 
targeted control, and modification of human life; a ‘calculated biopolitics’ that extracts 
and maximizes forces from the human body towards the production of a particular form 
of life (Kristensen, 2013: 20, 26, 38, 65).  
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3 Data and Methods 
Research Design   
The research design for this study is document analysis. “Document analysis is a 
systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents--both printed and electronic 
(computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (Bowen, 2009: 27). Data is to be 
examined with the intent of extracting “meaning, understanding, and empirical 
knowledge” (Ibid: 27). Documents analyzed are logged without a researcher’s 
involvement, and consist of text and images (Ibid: 27). Examples of documents may 
include newspapers, organisational or institutional reports, survey data, books, public 
records etc. They are referred to as ‘social facts’ since they are made and distributed in 
means that are socially ordered (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997: 47; Bowen, 2009: 27). This 
data can be located in “libraries, newspaper archives, historical society offices, and 
organisational or institutional files” (Bowen, 2009: 27).  
With document analysis, a review of literature is integrated into the study, when 
previous studies are included raw data is not analysed; only the interpretation of that data 
is used (Ibid: 27). There are many different functions/use for documentary material 
(Bowen, 2009: 29). In relation to this study, data in documents can provide additional 
information to the study, and knowledge base. Or they can be used to validate findings or 
evidence derived from other sources (Ibid: 30). For example, in a study on teacher 
education programs the researcher (Hoepfl, 1994) used newspaper reports, university 
policy documents, and department self-evaluation data in corroboration with interviews 
(Hoepfl, 1997). The combination of data sources is referred to as triangulation – “the use 
of multiple methods or data sources in qualitative research to develop a comprehensive 
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understanding of phenomena” (Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso, Blythe and Neville, 
2014: 545). There are several different types of triangulation (investigator, theory, data 
source, method); data source triangulation in particular is significant to this study, as it 
uses several (at least two) sources of data (Bowen, 2009: 28; Ibid: 545). For example, 
data source triangulation could consist of public records with a written document 
(Write.com, 2018). Triangulating data provides credibility since it reduces potential bias 
by testing the validity (trustworthiness) through the convergence of multiple sources of 
evidence (Bowen, 2009: 28; Carter et al., 2014: 545; Eisner, 1991: 110).  
The analytic process involves “skimming (superficial examination), reading 
(thorough examination), and interpretation” (Bowen, 2009: 32). This involves finding, 
choosing, evaluating and synthesising data comprised in documents. Data is extracted 
from key words, phrases or passages, and then structures and codes them into themes, 
categories, and key concepts (Labuschagne, 2003: 101).	  It is an iterative process that uses 
components of content analysis and thematic analysis. Content analysis organizes 
information into categories associated with the main research questions (Bowen, 2009: 
32). Thematic analysis recognizes patterns and emerging themes within the data that 
develop into categories for analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 82). The process 
involves more of a meticulous focus on reading and review of the material. 
Characteristics within the data are selected for the construction of codes and categories 
that reveal major themes. Predefined codes may also be used, particularly if the document 
analysis is supplementary to other sources in the study (Bowen, 2009: 32). Objectivity 
and sensitivity (reacting to subtle meanings) is to be used when analyzing documents 
(Ibid: 32). 
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There are many advantages of document analysis. It is an efficient, less time-
consuming method, as it selects data instead of collects data. It is more available, 
accessed through public domains and the Internet (Bowen, 2009: 31). It is a more cost-
effective than other methods, and more likely to be used when it is not viable to collect 
new data. There is a lack of obtrusiveness and reactivity, and there is stability since 
documents are not affected by the research process, or researcher. This counters issues of 
reflexivity innate within other qualitative research methods. Documents remain 
appropriate for repeated analyses. There is exactness; names, references and details are 
included (Ibid: 31). Limitations of document analysis include insufficient detail, since 
some documents may be produced for non-research purposes. There may be low 
retrievability with some documents, and an inadequate gathering of documents may 
insinuate 'biased selectivity' (Yin, 1994: 80). Document retrieval from organisations is 
mainly affiliated with corporate policies that adhere to the organisation's agendas 
(Bowen, 2009: 31). Furthermore, because the documents in this study are not for research 
purposes – specifically the credit card companies’ terms and conditions, there is only a 
portion of detail, which does not thoroughly answer the research questions. Thus the 
concept of biopolitics is not entirely addressed and examined, which limits the theoretical 
framework of the study. However with document analysis there is enough detail to 
understand how elements of biopolitics, particularly how consumer-citizenship is 
indicative in the terms through securitizing identity, responsibilization of risk and 
consumerism, and commodification of customers from an empirical level, as expressed in 
the analysis section.  
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Data Collection 
In this study, I combined data sources by analyzing Visa and Mastercard 
Canadian privacy policies and the literature (journal articles, newspaper articles, internet 
material). Since the policies are used to verify the literature, a few are suitable in 
providing sufficient information for the research (Bowen, 2009: 33). The analysis of two 
sets of policies along with the literature triangulates the data, offering credibility, and 
reducing potential bias (Bowen, 2009: 28; Carter et al., 2014: 545; Eisner, 1991: 110). 
The documents are stable and exact, indicating a lack of obtrusiveness and reactivity, 
countering any issues of reflexivity and suitable for repeated analyses (Bowen, 2009: 31). 
Although corporate policies are more likely aligned with the organizations principles, and 
there is the possibility of insufficient detail, the advantages of using document analysis 
outweigh the limitations. There is no software or additional instrument used other than 
the human instrument. Using content and thematic analyses complements the research 
questions as information is organized into categories that relate to the research questions, 
and patterns and themes are recognized within the policies that develop into categories 
for analysis (Bowen, 2009: 32; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 82). Furthermore, the 
Canadian Privacy Regime - sections of the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) is the legislation that informs organizations on the 
utilization of personal information. The analysis of relevant sections of PIPEDA 
interprets whether the privacy policies of credit card companies meet the legal 
requirements or not by comparing the content and words listed. The analysis also 
examines if the limitations set out in the law enable or constrains the credit card 
companies’ exercise of biopolitics. 
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Measures 
“Theory driven code development” is a common approach in social science 
research (Boyatzis, 1999: 33). The theory instigates the researcher to formulate indicators 
or evidence that support the theory, the elements of theory or hypotheses drives the 
substance of the code (Ibid: 33). Precodes consisting of words and/or phrases are grouped 
into 5 categories. This predefined framework is used as a data management tool for 
organizing sections of similar or related text to support in analysis (Crabtree & Miller, 
1999). The use of a template offers credibility to the study since it provides a trail for 
evidence (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 84).  The codes are derived from material 
within the literature and research questions through a theoretical lens of biopolitics.  
The structure of the codes in this study is partly from Boyatzis (1999, 31) instructions on 
developing meaningful thematic codes. This consists of  “a label, (i.e. a name), a 
definition of what the theme concerns (i.e., the characteristic or issue constituting the 
theme), and a description of how to know when the theme occurs (i.e. indicators on how 
to “flag” the theme)”. “A ‘good thematic code’ is one that captures the qualitative 
richness of the phenomenon. It is usable in the analysis, interpretation and presentation of 
the research” (Boyatzis, 1999: 31). 
Securitizing identity (larger category) – Definition: As the proliferation of sites where 
individuals are made responsible for establishing their official identity as a condition of 
access to the rights and responsibilities of (consumer) citizenship. Descriptive phrases: 
“collecting information on activities” “personal information you provide us with” 
“conducting payment transactions” “information/action required for said purposes” 
“identifying information”.   
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Risk management (subcategory) – Definition: Actively responsibilized in minimizing risk 
and threats i.e. fraud. Shifting of risk onto individual. Descriptive phrases: “security” 
“protect” “prevention of illegal activity, threats or violations,” “not responsible for other 
companies practices” “customer review other policies”. 
Convenient access/consumerism (subcategory) – Definition: Entrance into circuits of 
interests. Descriptive phrases: “personalize experience” “access to features” “fulfill your 
requests” “marketing” “contests”. 
Commodification of consumers – Definition: Production of consumers into tradable 
assets from data. Descriptive phrases: “collection and sharing of personal information” 
“aggregation of customer information for said purposes, i.e. marketing” “engagement or 
transferring of information with third-parties”. 
Awareness on the utilization of data - Definition: Explicitly articulates the purpose, 
collection and sharing of data. Descriptive phrases: “use” “collection” “sharing” 
“purpose”.  
The thematic research analysis, as depicted as a deductive systematic step-by-step 
procedure using a prior template is also an iterative and reflexive practice (Fereday & 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006). It is search for recognizing patterns and emerging themes that are 
integral to the analysis and description of the phenomenon (Daly, Kellehear, & Gliksman, 
1997; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 82). The stages of data collection and analysis in 
this study were conducted simultaneously; this ensures a comprehensive analysis that 
consists of “careful reading and re-reading of the data” (Rice & Ezzy, 1999: 258). The 
data is analyzed for its sufficiency in supporting the phenomenon conveyed in the 
research questions, and lastly translated and presented (Hoepfl, 1997). The primary 
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objective was to from the data on how biopolitics is conceptualized through the credit 
card companies’ terms in managing the customer population through consumer-
citizenship. With specific focus on: securitizing identity, customer responsibilization of 
risk and convenient access/consumerism, and the commodification of consumers. The 
thematic coding, and iterative process enables the ability to recognize and decipher the 
themes and patterns associated with biopolitics, and any indications or implications that 
make these facets of biopolitics empirical and evident throughout the terms and 
conditions. 
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4 Data Analysis 
Canadian Privacy Regime and the Limits of Law 
 The purpose of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act, is “… to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a 
manner that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to their personal 
information and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information 
for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances” 
(Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000. c. 5, s. 3). 
Sections from the act are analyzed that specifically relate to, and provide a foundation for 
interpreting the credit card privacy policies legal obligations, and application or non-
application of biopolitics and consumer-citizenship. The principle sections are: 
Accountability, Identifying Purpose, Consent, Limiting Collection, Limiting Use, 
Disclosure, and Retention, Accuracy, Safeguards, and Individual Access. 
   
Securitization of identity and Convenient Access/Consumerism 
Visa and Mastercard privacy policies clearly state the emphasis on the 
securitization of identity. One phrase in particular articulates this: parties may access 
cookies, and tracking technologies on your computer or device in order to ‘collect 
information about web-browsing activities…over time and across different websites and 
services’ (VISA Privacy Policy, 2016). This reiterates to how technologies bind 
distinguishing, transactional data to subjects through space and time as they cross 
networks, and participate in exchanges with various organizations (Gates, 2010: 420, 
424). Furthermore, personal information is used and shared with financial institutions or 
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merchants to “process payment transactions”, “including authorization, clearing, 
chargebacks and other related dispute resolution activities” (Mastercard-Global Privacy 
Notice, 2017). The customer must establish/authenticate their identity (give identifying 
information) for access to engage in transactions; this translates to subjects constituting 
themselves as (consumer)-citizens through rights and responsibilities, and performative 
acts (Isin & Nielson, 2008: 2, 18; Rose, 1999: 241; Rygiel, 2010: 30). Citizenship 
practices as performative acts (Isin & Nielson, 2008: 2, 18; Rygiel, 2010: 30) consist of 
engaging in transactions, and consumerism, all which require the authentication of 
identity (Rose, 1999: 241). Foucault (1995: 222) states the management and the 
manipulation of the population involves techniques that direct people to be active 
subjects that exercise their freedom in accordance with their own interests (Kristensen, 
2013: 51). Thus, citizen-consumers act in accordance with ‘market principles’ and 
continually engage in transactions to “maximise benefits and secure self-interests” 
(Ajana, 2013: 135). Citizenship is significant to how biopower is exercised, because 
“power can only be exerted over subjects who are free” (Foucault, 1994: 139). 
Consumers are seen as free citizens because they have the ability to make choices 
(Rygiel, 2010: 36); instantiating citizenship claims to “movement, access, consumption 
and entrepreneurial lifestyles” (Ajana, 2013: 127).  
The policies significance on attaining personal information for customer 
consumption and convenient access is further alluded in how Mastercard and Visa 
monitor data and for what purposes. The companies state their service providers, partners 
and third parties may collect, and use information about your activities and patterns of 
behaviour on their websites, pages and apps, and other third-party applications and 
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websites to administer advertisements and content based on individual interests. Visa 
calls this practice a ‘behavioural advertising practice’, or ‘retargeting’ (VISA Privacy 
Policy, 2016). Visa and Mastercard state that personal information is used to fulfill 
requests, respond to inquiries, and manage accounts, along with communicating 
promotions, services and contests of the company and third parties. For example, 
personal information is shared “with third parties whose features you use in connection 
with our products and services, including social networks” (Mastercard Global Privacy 
Notice, 2018). “If you sign up to receive offers from retail or travel partners through 
Visa, we may share your Personal Information with those partners as needed to provide 
promotions and marketing communications, to validate referrals, measure success of such 
promotions, or operate the programs” (Visa Global Privacy Notice, 2018). In other 
words, those who securitize identity – the responsibilized homo-oeconomicus – are 
‘marked’ holders of a ‘surplus of rights’ (Balibar, 2002: 83), the personal information 
given or obtained “is any information that we can use to identify, locate or contact you” 
(Visa Global Policy Notice, 2018). Since customers submit personal information either 
directly or through other third parties, engage in transactions, and consent to tracking 
technology they pass those required points that need to be met in order to gain access 
(Rose, 1999: 243). They enable the identification of themselves, the ‘marking for rights’ 
through the securitization of identity. A biopolitical process that represents a ‘calibration 
of the individual body to the species body – requirements of the economy’ (Isin, 2004: 
221) and calibration brings consumer life into the “realm of calculation” (Rygiel, 2010: 
113). In other words, securitizing identity not only produces a productive population and 
enhances the life of the consumer-citizen by offering access to circuits of consumption 
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and resources, but also functions for the whole economic condition of the credit card 
industry.  
Section 4.3.8 of PIPEDA states, “an individual may withdraw consent at any 
time, subject to legal or contractual restrictions and reasonable notice. The organization 
shall inform the individual of the implications of such withdrawal” (PIPEDA, SC 2000. 
c. 5, s. 4.3.8). Mastercard and Visa give customers the choice to opt-out of the automated 
collection and use of certain information, for example, behavioural-targeted advertising 
and marketing practices, and receiving certain types of cookies (Mastercard-Global 
Privacy Notice, 2017; Visa Privacy Policy, 2016). Providing an option of exclusion, as 
expressed through both the credit card terms and enforced by legislation enables the 
biopolitical governance over a population by segregating those subpopulations 
considered undesirable; this ensures containment of the undesirable and enables freedom 
for the desirable citizen population (Ajana, 2013: 129; Foucault, 1978: 256; Rygiel, 2010: 
103). The level of exclusion depends on the amount of identifying data permitted and 
activity engaged in by the consumer. For example, Mastercard states that individuals can 
simply limit the use of online activity, opt-out of cookies, “refrain from conducting 
payments or from submitting personal information” to avoid their personal information 
and identity from being used and shared. However, Mastercard does state that, “there are 
consequences from failing to do so” (Mastercard-Global Privacy Notice, 2018). Not 
engaging in consumerism activities and providing personal information is a mechanism 
of control that restricts access and entitlements, as listed in the terms ‘products and 
services, apps, or online services’ may not be accessible, or access to ‘certain content and 
product features’ may be denied (Mastercard-Global Privacy Notice, 2017; Visa Privacy 
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Policy, 2016). This indicates that there are several levels of exclusion, to opt-out of 
cookies or limit activity online is one level of exclusion, in which the group of customers 
is still incorporated through a “principle of activity” (Rose, 1999: 240). These customers 
are still incorporated to consume because they securitize their identity (Rose, 1999: 240), 
although they are excluded from receiving certain services, and marketing and 
advertising by both the credit card company and third parties.  
To not securitize identity i.e. not provide the personal information requested, nor 
engage in financial transactions, is another level of exclusion that would fit the concept of 
an “anti-citizen” (Rose, 1999: 240); this excluded group negates rational, self-governing 
behaviour of citizens (Rose, 1999: 240). Although the terms and conditions do not 
specifically state the ‘consequences’ of not “conducting payment transactions”, and not 
“submitting personal information”, it is noted, “there are consequences of failing to do 
so” (Mastercard Global Privacy Notice, 2018). There are risks and effects of their non-
actions, and it can be implied that if a customer does not comply they are denied their 
right to be citizen-consumer. Deprived of the neoliberalist principle of laissez-faire for 
free exchange within commerce (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 280; Foucault, 2007: 
350; Kristensen, 2013: 61) and ability to maximize self-interests and benefits (Ajana, 
2013: 135). Since citizenship is exhibited in a subject through the utilization of 
techniques that assist in achieving ‘personal fulfilment’ and ‘self-advancement’ (Miller & 
Rose, 2008: 48, 82), those that fail to pass points for access and benefits negate 
citizenship, thus are constituted as ‘anti-citizens’. These groups essentially create their 
own inequality, as there are no rights or entitlements without individual responsibilities 
(Ericson et al., 2000: 555), they are undesirable due to an exercise of irresponsible choice 
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(van Munster, 2005: 6). In other words, through (consumer) citizenship, biopolitics 
manages the population, and regulates their freedom by constructing the included from 
the excluded (Rygiel, 2010: 28, 67). Those who refuse to exercise their duties of 
consumer-citizenship forfeit the benefits, they are rendered as disqualified bodies because 
they do not authenticate their identity or act performatively; thereby they are not 
conducive or productive in relation to the market (Foucault, 2008: 147; Rose, 1999: 241). 
As Dodge and Kitchen state the analysis of people’s behaviour and patterns is used to 
“channel particular goods, services, information, opportunities, and life chances to some 
people and not others” (Dodge & Kitchen, 2005: 876). These examples from the credit 
card policies, and the applicable section of PIPEDA indicate how biopower governs the 
population through the freedom, choice and responsibility of consumers, particularly how 
convenient access to circuits of consumption and the optimization of an entrepreneurial 
lifestyle are enabled for those groups who exercise the duties of consumer-citizenship by 
securitizing identity, while consequences – or categories of exclusion – are enabled for 
those that exercise their rights and freedom irresponsibility; contrary to the principles of 
consumer-citizenship.    
 
Securitization of identity and Risk Management 
 Biopower in exercised within the policies by using risk management as a 
component of securitizing identity; this mobilizes the consumer to be self-responsibilized 
citizens. The company is able to govern better and increase profit by governing less,  
“through the entrepreneurship of autonomous actors” (Rose: 1999: 139). For example, 
Visa states that personal information is used and shared to ‘analyze and monitor website 
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usage, secure websites, prevent, investigate and take action against fraud, threats and 
enforce policies’ (VISA Privacy Policy, 2016). Personal information is used to ‘protect 
against unauthorized transactions, claims and other liabilities, and manage risk exposure 
and security of our payments network’ (Mastercard-Global Privacy Notice, 2017). Also, 
personal information is shared and disclosed to ‘prevent fraud, and to ensure security of 
payments and transactions’ (Mastercard-Global Privacy Notice, 2017). Clearly articulated 
in the policies, securitizing identity allows credit card companies the ability to 
biopolitically govern the customer population by monitoring customer behaviour and 
activities, and control and regulate access (Gates, 2010: 419). The terms enable 
governance through the autonomy and freedom of consumer-citizens by mobilizing 
customers to consent to the use and sharing of their personal information for their own 
welfare, and security. It illustrates how credit card industries are able to govern the 
population ‘at a distance’ (Rose, 2000: 324), through the choices of the customer. Identity 
fraud as a risk in particular impedes upon the capability of a consumer citizen to exercise 
self-entrepreneurship and freedom within consumerism activities (Marron, 2008: 24). By 
highlighting ‘threat and security’ the customer population is mobilized to securitize 
identity, particularly the securitization of everyday transactions (Muller, 2004: 287). 
Coinciding with Whitson and Haggerty (2008), this logic encourages citizens to bring 
elements of their disembodied data double into securitizing methods of regulation and 
examination (574). Thus, customers will consent to the utilization of their personal 
information to “protect against and prevent fraud, unauthorized transactions… and verify 
your identity” (Mastercard-Global Privacy Notice, 2018). This securitization process can 
be viewed as a “biopolitical maintenance or regulation of the welfare of (consumer) 
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citizens” (Muller, 2004: 285). A biopolitical apparatus that facilitates a regulatory and 
promotive function within the population, that cancels or manages a phenomenon i.e. 
fraud, ensuring favourable effects and an optimization of life (Foucault, 2003: 246; 
Foucault, 2007: 59).  It facilitates a type of governance that seeks to amend the behaviour 
of subjects, without challenging their autonomous nature (Miller & Rose, 2008: 39). In 
other words, securitizing your identity is a biopolitical apparatus that governs through 
freedom by appealing to the interests of citizens (Foucault, 2008: 63-65); appeasing the 
interests of security concerns of the financial institution and the consumer (Ibid: 287), 
ensures confidence for the consumer, and generates capital for the industry (Gates, 2010: 
429; Muller, 2004: 287).  
Onus is shifted onto the consumer to become culpable of risk by adopting self-
management, and risk-managing activities (Ajana, 2013: 117; Gates, 2010: 419, 427; 
Marron, 2008: 34). Visa states “we are not responsible for the collection, usage and 
disclosure policies and practices (including the data security practices) of other 
organizations, including any personal information you disclose” (VISA Privacy Policy, 
2016). Personal information disclosed – consenting to the use of that information ensures 
the individual bears the risk, not the company. This coincides with ‘risk shifting’ the 
responsibility of risk falls on the individual; in the event of failure, ‘blameworthiness’ is 
reinforced onto the individual (McDermott, et al., 2017: 2). Visa states “we may share 
your Personal Information with merchants and other partners through Visa’s partnerships, 
co-branded or promotional programs or websites, but only to the extent you have a 
relationship with such partner or you authorize the sharing… We may share your 
Personal Information with other partners, but only if we have your consent”. A failure, 
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for example, could be Visa sharing personal data to a partner that leads to negative 
consequences to the customer, yet blame is placed on the customer because they 
consented to its use. As La Porte (2013) states procedures are listed “to assure that 
responsibility/blame is placed on the workforce, not placed on senior institutional actors” 
(259). This hinders workers from raising concerns or disputing practices of the 
companies (McDermott et al., 2017: 4). In context with this analysis, responsibilization 
through terms indirectly prevents customers from raising concerns about the company’s 
responsibility for customer information and inhibits customers from challenging the 
credit card’s company practices. This represents the subjectification of the subject, a 
mobilization that works through the freedoms of consumer-citizenship that enables 
apparatuses of control to govern the population (Ajana, 2013: 127; Rose, 1999: 94).   
 Section 4.1.3 of PIPEDA states, “an organization is responsible for personal 
information in its possession or custody, including information that has been transferred 
to a third party for processing. The organization shall use contractual or other means to 
provide a comparable level of protection while the information is being processed by a 
third party” (PIPEDA, SC 2000. c. 5, s. 4.1.3). This section denotes a constraint on the 
biopolitical self-responsibilization, risk management, and self-entrepreneurship of 
consumer-citizens. It limits the company’s shifting of risk onto the consumer and the 
neoliberal governing ‘at a distance’ (Rose, 2000: 234) by holding the company 
responsible over the utilization of customer personal information. Although the credit 
card companies comply with this section of legislation, the privacy terms mobilize the 
customer to be a responsibilized consumer-citizen. Wherein the customer is accountable 
for how their personal information is used, even though the credit card companies 
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facilitate the collection and use of customer personal information. Visa states “we have 
relationships with third party advertising companies that place advertisements on and 
perform tracking and reporting functions for our website and other websites. Although 
we do not share any Personal Information with these third-party advertising companies, 
they may place cookies on your computer when you visit our website or other websites so 
that they can display targeted advertisements to you. However, this Privacy Notice does 
not cover the collection methods or use of the information collected by these companies” 
(Visa Global Privacy Notice, 2018). Visa provides an opportunity for other organizations 
to collect information on customers, yet forfeits responsibility, and implies the 
responsibilization and consent of the customer by emphasizing customers’ actions on 
their website – ‘when you visit our website’. Furthermore, Mastercard states they 
“strongly suggest” the customer review the third-party privacy policies they link 
customers with, as they “are not responsible” (Mastercard Global Privacy Notice, 2018). 
Mastercard also states that if they transfer or sell a portion of their business/assets they 
“reserve the right to transfer personal information,” yet they will use “reasonable efforts 
to direct the transferee to use personal information” provided in conjunction with their 
Global Privacy Notice. Furthermore, the customer is told to contact the entity about the 
transfer and processing of their personal information (Mastercard-Global Privacy Notice, 
2017).  
 These individual efforts are positioned around a neoliberal rationale of risk - 
‘prudentialism,’ in which risk is interpreted as shared (implicating the whole consumer 
population – indicating biopower) yet is individually acted upon through the calculation 
and minimization of risk by a citizen (Ajana, 2013: 114, 117; Aradau & van Munster, 
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2007: 103; Rygiel, 2010: 67). A mode of self-governance - ‘individualization of security’ 
(Rose, 1999: 239), or ‘care of the virtual self’ (Whitson & Haggerty, 2008: 574), where 
one is to be rational, skilled and knowledgeable in terms of potential risk (Rose, 2000a: 
328). In other words, through citizen-self-governance, credit card companies shift risk 
onto the customer, capitalizing on the neoliberalist ethos of self-autonomy, choice, and 
freedom (Ajana, 2013: 117, 118; Miller & Rose, 2008: 92). Companies govern ‘at a 
distance’ by mitigating their responsibility over customer personal information, yet 
maintain governance over the customer population. Not actively being aware of third 
party practices and policies in the collection, use, and sharing of personal information 
indicates a failure to act in compliance with citizenship. Through the exercise of 
irresponsibility through freedom one is rendered blameworthy for the result in failure - 
‘responsibility of the risky’ (van Munster, 2005: 6). The biopolitical governance through 
freedom ensures subjects have the choice to contribute to their own prosperity, while also 
contributing to the prosperity of the population, yet this involves an abjection (or 
blameworthiness) on those that are not self-governing (van Munster, 2005: 6). The self-
governing, self-responsibilization of risk facilitated through the terms is a biopolitical 
tool that enacts a type of control that seeks to regulate behaviour across the population to 
ensure maximum efficiency and minimization of the negative as a whole (Feeley & 
Simon, 1992: 452; Foucault, 2007: 70-74; Rose, 1999: 234; Rose, 2000: 325).  
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Commodification of the Consumer 
 The mobilizing of the citizen consumer to securitize identity for access to 
resources, and to manage risk is an exercise of biopower that allows credit card 
companies to collect, use and share information. The utilization of customer information 
enables the categorization and commodification of the population based on value. 
Personal information Visa and Mastercard collect on the customer population may be 
obtained from ‘financial institutions, merchants, other entities connected with 
transactions and services, and any publicly available channels’ (Mastercard-Global 
Privacy Notice, 2017) along with any ‘social media channels, and third parties’ (VISA 
Privacy Policy, 2016). “For example, if you communicate with Visa using Facebook or 
Twitter, we may receive additional information about you from your profile. We may 
also obtain information from third party data suppliers who help us enhance our records” 
(Visa Global Privacy Notice, 2018). “We may collect Personal Information from third 
party digital wallets and online merchants when you make an online purchase” (Visa 
Global Privacy Notice, 2018). Digital wallets for example, Apple Pay, may use 
biometrics through Touch ID (as mentioned above in section 2.3). Although the terms do 
not explicitly state the use of biometrics, the assumption is that biometric data would be 
collected because of the use of digital wallets. The terms state that information can 
include “contact information (such as name, postal or e-mail address, and phone number), 
business contact information (such as job title, department and name of organization), 
username and password, payment account information, photographs, articles and 
comments, mobile device unique identifier, geo-location data, shopping behavior and 
preferences, language preference, age, date of birth, gender and family status)” 
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(Mastercard-Global Privacy Notice, 2017). Along with the “payment card number, 
location of transaction, time and date of transactions, enhanced transaction information, 
and the amount of transaction…. demographic data about you or your household such as 
census records that tell us about the average ages or incomes in a certain neighbourhood” 
(Visa Global Privacy Policy, 2018).  
Section 4.9.3 of PIPEDA states, “in providing an account of third parties to 
which it has disclosed personal information about an individual, an organization should 
attempt to be as specific as possible. When it is not possible to provide a list of the 
organizations to which it has actually disclosed information about an individual, the 
organization shall provide a list of organizations to which it may have disclosed 
information about the individual” (PIPEDA, SC 2000. c. 5, s. 4.5.2). The terms do not 
specifically name the organizations they share customer information with, which could 
again imply the responsibilization of the customer to exercise their duty as citizen and 
determine that for him or herself. Furthermore, the use and sharing of personal 
information for security and consumerism purposes to financial institutions/entities, third 
parties, affiliates, service providers, merchants, partners (i.e. retail and travel 
organizations) illustrates how credit card companies are able to monitor behaviour and 
define customer characteristics. As mentioned in the above sections, monitoring and 
analyzing behaviour for prevention of risk and taking action against threats, and ensuring 
security of financial activity, along with the use of behavioural-targeted advertising, 
marketing practices, tracking technologies, and cookies demonstrates a biopolitical 
surveillance that manages the species-body through the extraction of its ‘vital signs’ 
(Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; 273, 291; Foucault, 2007: 310; Zwick & Knott, 2009: 
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224). The monitoring and utilization of customer personal information corresponds with 
Lyon’s (2003b, 1) illustration of surveillance, how it functions to “sort people into 
categories, assigning worth or risk, in ways that have real effects on their life chances.” 
Enabling a ‘social sorting’ through ‘digital discrimination’ (Rygiel, 2010: 129). The 
policies make note on the anonymization and aggregation of personal information when 
preparing and furnishing aggregated data reports: 
 “including, but not limited to, the following: compilations, analyses, 
analytical and predictive models and rules, and other aggregated reports 
for the purpose of advising our issuing and acquiring institutions, 
merchants and other customers and partners regarding past and potential 
future patterns of spending, fraud, and other insights that may be extracted 
from this data” (Mastercard-Global Privacy Notice, 2017).  
The aggregation of data conceptualizes how biopolitics is associated with techniques that 
involve algorithms and coding of information (Dillon & Reid, 2001: 65). Since it is 
biopower that makes the consumer population visible and knowable through the 
continuous extraction, and measurement of consumer data bits and reconfiguration into 
specific categorizations of codes (Gates, 2010: 419; Marron, 2007: 119; Zwick & Knott, 
2009:235). Ajana (2013) states, what is stored about an individual is “constitutive and 
inseparable from who that person is” (14). In other words, customer identities are 
constructed or represented based on the information collected; “data elements” allow the 
companies to ‘identify and locate you’ (Visa Global Privacy Notice, 2018). Aggregated 
data on spending habits, geo-location, demographic data, gender and family status etc. 
constructs particular populations, which presents a measure of value or risk for a product 
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or service within the company, as well as for third party entities. This information 
consists of ‘identity markers’ that customers make evident through their locations and 
movements, which entail of successions and patterns that proceed to configure the 
identity of the individual (Ajana, 2013: 19, 134; Whitson & Haggerty, 2008: 574). When 
the individual is identified, the individual unit can be acted upon, processed in a manner 
that clusters them with other similar units to suit particular purposes (Coll, 2013: 204; 
Dodge & Kitchin, 2004: 853). For example, “Visa enhances Card Transaction Data and 
uses it to generate anonymized and aggregated consumer spending and marketing reports 
and other data products that enable companies to improve their marketing efforts. These 
solutions help companies identify consumers that they can target. For example, a 
marketing report may show that consumers in one postal code tend to spend more at auto 
parts stores than consumers in other postal codes. These products also help companies 
determine the effectiveness of their marketing campaigns” (Visa Global Privacy Notice, 
2018). These processes target and enable the manufacturing of consumers as ‘valuable 
information commodities’ through the collection, and sharing of personal information, 
which depict a modular simulation that creates economic growth (Zwick & Knott, 2009: 
224, 238, 239). It is biopolitical because elements of behaviour are “weighed and 
valued”, representing a capitalization of life through the regulation of the “contingent 
economy of species life” (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 268). 
 Section 4.5.2 of PIPEDA states “organizations should develop guidelines and 
implement procedures with respect to the retention of personal information. These 
guidelines should include minimum and maximum retention periods. Personal 
information that has been used to mak
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long enough to allow the individual access to the information after the decision has been 
made. An organization may be subject to legislative requirements with respect to 
retention periods”. Section 4.5.3 states, “personal information that is no longer required 
to fulfil the identified purposes should be destroyed, erased, or made anonymous. 
Organizations shall develop guidelines and implement procedures to govern the 
destruction of personal information”	  Section 4.6.3 also states “personal information that 
is used on an ongoing basis, including information that is disclosed to third parties, 
should generally be accurate and up-to-date, unless limits to the requirement for 
accuracy are clearly set out”, and section 4.7 notes that “personal information shall be 
protected by security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information”  
(PIPEDA, SC 2000. c. 5, s. 4.5.2, s. 4.5.3, s. 4.6.3, s. 4.7). These sections make the 
company responsible over the protection and use of personal information, not the 
customer which appears to constrain the principles of biopolitical self-governance, yet 
section 4.9 states that, “upon request, an individual shall be informed of the existence, 
use, and disclosure of his or her personal information and shall be given access to that 
information. An individual shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness of 
the information and have it amended as appropriate… Exceptions to the access 
requirement should be limited and specific. The reasons for denying access should be 
provided to the individual upon request” (PIPEDA, SC 2000. c. 5, s. 4.5.2). This section 
however implies the self-responsibilization of consumer-citizens in governing their own 
data double as reflected in the credit card privacy terms.  
 Visa states individuals have the right to access and edit personal information they 
store, and Mastercard states that customers in “certain jurisdictions…you may have the 
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right to request access to and receive information about the Personal Information we 
maintain about you, to update and correct inaccuracies in your Personal Information, to 
restrict or to object to the processing of your Personal Information, to have the 
information anonymized or deleted” (Mastercard Global Privacy Notice, 2018). Visa 
does state, “we use physical, technical, organizational, and administrative safeguards to 
help protect your Personal Information from unauthorized access or loss. For example, 
we use technology like encryption to protect sensitive Personal Information (such as your 
account number) during transmission. We will retain your Personal Information for as 
long as the information is needed for the purposes listed above and for any additional 
period that may be required or permitted by law” (Visa Global Privacy Policy, 2018). 
Mastercard states “we also take measures to delete your Personal Information or keep it 
in a form that does not permit identifying you when this information is no longer 
necessary for the purposes for which we process it, unless we are required by law to keep 
this information for a longer period” and that they comply with “mandatory retention 
periods provided by law” (Mastercard-Global Privacy Notice, 2018). Although 
individuals have these options available for correcting data or preventing the utilization 
of their data, and information is only obtained for a period of time and for purposes listed 
above and deleted (Visa does not say however that they delete the data, only Mastercard), 
and safeguards are in place for the protection against unauthorized access or loss. There 
is still the potential to use and share inaccurate data if customers are not actively being 
aware and responsibilized on the utilization of their data, and correcting inaccuracies. 
Furthermore, once data is shared the ability to retrieve personal information that has 
already been shared/multiplied to third parties is more difficult. As Boutin states “it’s 
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practically impossible for anyone to find all the information being passed around about 
themselves, or to correct it” (2016). In other words, biopower manages the customer 
population by responsibilizing the customer to rectify or prevent the use of their data 
double. Yet, handing over a ‘metaphysical piece of yourself’ (engaging in transactions) 
makes it difficult to maintain control over, challenge, or intercede in the production and 
circulation of a data double (Alterman, 2003: 143-145; Ruppert, 2011: 227). 
Furthermore, the dissemination of the data double through varying ‘centres of 
calculation’ function for services and power that are generally unknown to the subject 
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 613). This dichotomous relation illustrates how biopower is 
both constraining and productive (Rygiel, 2010: 36). Power is not directly acted upon 
customers, but it is exercised upon the actions of the customer (Foucault, 1994: 137). 
Customers are thereby mobilized to engage as free citizens by presenting personal 
information, yet power and control is enabled over the customer through their own 
actions, making it difficult for the customer to retain control over their data double.  
   This biopolitical concept is further conceptualized in the purposes of customer 
information. It is difficult to determine if information is utilized for purposes outlined in 
the terms, function creep may arise, as the initial collection and sharing of data has the 
potential for it to be used beyond its said purposes (European Commission, 2005: 16). 
Section 4.2 of PIPEDA states that “the purposes for which personal information is 
collected shall be identified by the organization at or before the time the information is 
collected”. Section 4.2.2 indicates, “The Limiting Collection principle (Clause 4.4) 
requires an organization to collect only that information necessary for the purposes that 
have been identified. Section 4.3.3 states “an organization shall not, as a condition of the 
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supply of a product or service, require an individual to consent to the collection, use, or 
disclosure of information beyond that required to fulfil the explicitly specified, and 
legitimate purposes”. Furthermore, section 4.2.4 states, “when personal information that 
has been collected is to be used for a purpose not previously identified, the new purpose 
shall be identified prior to use. Unless the new purpose is required by law, the consent of 
the individual is required before information can be used for that purpose”. Section 4.4.2 
also states “the requirement that personal information be collected by fair and lawful 
means is intended to prevent organizations from collecting information by misleading or 
deceiving individuals about the purpose for which information is being collected. This 
requirement implies that consent with respect to collection must not be obtained through 
deception” (PIPEDA, SC 2000. c. 5, s. 4.2, 4.2.2, 4.3.3, 4.2.4). The credit cards’ terms 
and conditions indicate the purposes of collection and use of personal information that 
may be obtained, yet Mastercard states (as seen above), that personal information may be 
used for “other insights”, which could imply information being used beyond what is 
explicitly specified in the terms, which raises concern over the collection of ‘necessary 
information’ for said legitimate purposes. Furthermore, they state that personal 
information may be used to “serve other purposes for which we provide specific notice at 
the time of collection, and as otherwise authorized or required by law” (Mastercard 
Global Privacy Notice, 2018), this could imply that the customer is not guaranteed that 
the purposes for using/sharing personal information will be as listed at the time of 
consent. Furthermore, when information is shared with third parties, ‘purposes’ may go 
beyond what is explicitly stated in the terms. For example, Mastercard and Visa state they 
share personal information with third party companies, public authorities, and even 
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governing authorities outside of the country. Mastercard states: “we may transfer your 
Personal Information to the United States and other countries which may not have the 
same data protection laws as the country in which you initially provided the information, 
but we will protect your Personal Information in accordance with this Global Privacy 
Notice” (Mastercard Global Privacy Notice, 2018). Although they state that they protect 
information in accordance with their policy, there is still a possibility that ‘purposes’ in 
initial collection may not be followed through because third parties may have other 
purposes that are not be restricted by laws. This also makes it difficult for customers to 
intercede in the circulation of their data double. 
The respective sections of PIPEDA: the obligation for credit card companies to 
name third parties, the safeguards, accuracy and restrictions placed on the utilization of 
personal information and the explicit purposes of utilizing personal information, along 
with the consent of the individual, and prohibition of misleading and deceiving 
individuals insinuates the attempt to constrain biopolitical practices. Particular the 
practices of sorting, commodifying and exploiting consumers, yet the potentiality for 
personal information to be used for ‘other purposes’, as inferred from the credit card 
terms, illustrates Foucault’s concept of biopolitics in how the assemblage of data doubles 
could lead to the exploitation of populations (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 273). Visa 
and/or Mastercard do not inform customers of new purposes if information has been 
made available to a different company they are partnered with yet work independently 
from, “we are not responsible for the content, your use of, nor the privacy practices of 
those” (Mastercard Global Privacy Notice, 2018). As already noted Mastercard states 
they “strongly suggest” the customer review the third-party privacy policies (Mastercard 
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Global Privacy Notice, 2018). Visa also states, “if you are participating in Visa offers or 
promotions, please also read the privacy notices provided by our partners” (Visa Global 
Privacy Notice, 2018). The companies mitigate their responsibility over customer 
personal information and shift the onus onto the consumers to determine that for 
themselves, yet the utilization of customer information can produce a sense of 
‘alienation’ between the subject and the data generated from the subject (Alterman, 2003: 
146). Once personal information is surrendered, and its utilization is consented to, it 
allows for the potentiality of misuse; granting other parties the use of identifying data for 
their own objectives (Alterman, 2003: 143; Ruppert, 2011: 227). “Other websites that 
may be accessible through this website have their own privacy policies and data 
collection, use and disclosure practices” (Visa Global Privacy Notice, 2018). In other 
words, the constitution of the consumer’s identity, or data double may potentially be 
jeopardized when the credit card company obtains personal information and makes it 
available to other parties. Not only does this affect one individual, but also has the 
potential to affect every consumer who offers their personal information, which 
implicates the population of consumers. This indicates the biopolitical governance over 
the population through the construction of these identities; as Van der Ploeg (1999a) 
states that identifying technologies do not necessarily identify a pre-existing identity, but 
function as a means of establishing an identity (300). Data can be manipulated, and 
‘partial’ or ‘underdetermined’ identities constructed, that may be inaccurate, are produced 
for manufacturing purposes and economic value (Boutin, 2016; Zwick & Knott, 2009: 
233). In other words, customer information is not just taken as ‘shaped and fixed’ but is 
used to ‘produce’ identities (Ruppert, 2011: 224). As Foucault (1983) states, “a subject is 
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not to be subjected (connoting disciplinary power) but to be subjectified” (Rygiel, 2011: 
224). Although the terms do not explicitly state customer populations are exploited based 
on the construction of identities, it can be implied that this could occur. The mention of 
aggregated consumer reports, other entities having different laws, the notice of third party 
policies, and the mitigation of responsibility for third party practices and personal 
information consented to, implies that ‘data subjects are produced through other actors 
that determine their identity and classification’ (Ruppert, 2011: 224). Essentially, acting 
and engaging as a consumer-citizen renders a customer limited in power. Companies 
acquiring control over the information of populations, and the manufacturing of identities 
and differentiation as valuable commodities illustrates the workings of biopower; as it is 
a biopolitical surveillance that manages subpopulations through imperfect representations 
of identities that creates consequential affects for the individual, and the population 
(Gates, 2010: 424; Lauer, 2008: 301,320, 321; Lyon, 2003a: 5).  
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5 Conclusion 
 This thesis sought to examine the biopolitics of the credit card industry in its 
governance over the consumer population through consumer-citizenship and the 
manufacturing of consumers into valuable information commodities. Of particular 
interest were how biometrics was utilized to securitize identity, and how it enabled the 
credit industry to obtain and monitor consumer data, and determine risk and value, 
thereby controlling financial movement and segregating and commodifying the 
population. The emphasis on neoliberalist principles of self-responsibilization, and 
entrepreneurship provided a way for the credit card company to minimize threat and 
maximize economic growth through the production and regulation of the consumer 
population. Biopolitics, as an umbrella concept, was used for addressing the techniques, 
inducements, and challenges of governing the consumer-population-body through 
technology in the name of risk, security and consumerism. This thesis also examined the 
Visa and Mastercard privacy policies, to examine the articulation of consumer-citizenship 
and how it enables consumers to securitize identity in response to risk-management and 
convenient access. As well as how it manufactures consumers into marketing 
commodities through the collection, use and sharing of data.  
The literature revealed that the securitization of identity illustrates biopolitical 
governance that enables the identification of the consumer-citizen, and division of the 
consumer population into desirable and undesirable groups, through the collection of 
data, observation of consumer activity, and regulation and control of financial mobility 
and consumerism. Biopower constitutes how members of a population are identified 
through the obtainment of knowledge and continuous examination and calculation of the 
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behaviour, activities, and contingencies of individuals. It determines the differences in 
measures of value and risk amongst populations, which are dependent upon the exercise 
of self-responsibilization. The credit card industry positions the securitization of identity 
as an act of consumer-citizenship, with emphasis on neoliberal values of self-governance, 
self-management, self-autonomy, choice and freedom. This process is rendered as an 
obligatory and peformative act of consumer-citizenship that manages risks i.e. identity 
fraud, and permits access to entitlements. Biopower, as both constraining and productive, 
can only act through the exercise of freedom of the citizen. Although several modes of 
behaviour equate with a neoliberalist exercise of consumer-citizenship, biometric 
technology in particular is implemented as a biopolitical security apparatus. This 
technology guards the consumer-citizen’s identity from risks, but also functions as a 
technology of self and freedom that facilitates the optimization of a quality of life, and 
constitutes a subject as a member of a desirable population. The biopolitical relationship 
between biometrics and the consumer-citizen enables a calibration of the individual body 
to the species body by calculating consumer life. It renders the population amendable and 
productive for the function of the economic condition of the credit card industry.  
 The development of biometric technology along with the collection and 
automization of data for the purposes of calculating the economic value and risk of 
consumer subpopulations illustrates a statistical expertise, a technique of biopower that 
responds to elements of life through regularization. The financial identity of the 
consumer is determined through behaviour and probabilities that reveal the competency 
to engage in circuits of consumption, and culpability of risk. Risk classes, and varying 
standards of inclusion and exclusion are depicted through statistical credit scoring. 
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Subjects are rendered as knowable and calculable in relation to the population through a 
continuous modulation to minimize financial loss and maximize financial gain.  
The relationship between biometrics and the data double facilitates the credit card 
industry’s commodification of consumers. These surveillance practices not only function 
to authenticate identity, but the information extracted through codes is processed and 
constructed into a particular identity, and thereby a group formed for specific objectives. 
These technologies enable a ‘social sorting’ through ‘digital discrimination’ that reduce 
identities into subpopulations of risk and value, inclusion and exclusion for particular 
markets that affect life chances, by limiting or expanding access. They represent an 
exercise of biopower that renders the consumer population manageable through targeted 
control practices of commodification and regulation that maximize benefits for financial 
industries.  
 The analysis on PIPEDA provides the legal framework for which these credit card 
companies can act, which revealed that Visa and Mastercard adhere to the federal privacy 
law. However, the analysis on applicable sections of PIPEDA in accordance with the 
credit card privacy terms illustrates that generally the sections act to constrain the 
biopolitical sorting, commodification and potential exploitation of consumer populations. 
Ensuring customer consent to legitimate purposes on the collection and use of personal 
information, protection and accuracy of information, guidelines that limit the companies’ 
use and sharing of personal information with third parties represent the recognition of 
protecting the identity of customers, and the prevention of credit card companies 
inappropriately manufacturing customers as valuable commodities. The legislation seeks 
to constrain the neoliberal governance ‘at a distance’ by limiting self-responsibilization, 
	  	   88	  
self-governance, and self-entrepreneurship of the consumer-citizen and makes companies 
ultimately responsible over customer personal information. Although it could also be 
interpreted that by mandating the rights of individuals, for example, ensuring customers 
can access their own personal information attained by the credit card company and 
choose to have it amended, enables self-governance over their data double; as 
responsibilization is placed on the customer to rectify personal information. Furthermore, 
legislating the opting out of consumerism activities, or on the utilization of personal 
information ensures the legal right to non-adherence of consumer-citizenship principles 
of self-entrepreneuship. Yet, the exercise and choice of those labeled irresponsible 
enables the segregation of the undesirable, facilitating categories of exclusion, which 
encourages the biopolitical aggregation and sorting of populations. Although there are 
some variations in how biopolitics can be constrained and also enabled through PIPEDA 
legislation, the credit card policies are clearly able to biopolitical govern the customer 
population and mobilize consumer-citizenship through its terms.  
This analysis of Visa and Mastercard privacy policies reveals through its terms 
the emphasis on subjects to securitize their identity for risk management, and access to 
consumerism. Specifically, there is a prominence on citizenship claims to access and 
entitlement that mobilizes citizenship practices of providing personal information, 
engaging in transactions, and opting in for consumerist goods i.e. marketing, products 
and services; reflecting the principles of self-entrepreneurship and responsibilization. 
Opting-out of the collection, use and sharing of data is provided, however providing this 
option operates to exclude and segregate undesirable populations. From the terms, there 
perceives to be two levels of exclusion. The one is a customer subpopulation that is still 
	  	   89	  
incorporated through a ‘principle of activity’, meaning they securitize identity by 
providing personal information, and engaging in transactions, yet opt out of certain 
circuits of consumption i.e. marketing, services, targeting. The other consists of ‘anti-
citizens’, which do not securitize their identity; they reflect the irresponsible choice and 
action of consumer-citizenship, thus they forfeit citizenship claims to access and benefits. 
They are depicted as non-productive to the industry; thereby they reap the ‘consequences’ 
of refusing to authenticate their identity. The emphasis on securitizing identity represents 
the biopolitical process that ‘calibrates the individual body to the species body’, and the 
management of the population that identifies and constructs the desirable from the 
undesirable.  
 The terms articulate biopolitical governance that mobilizes the customer to 
exercise citizenship principles of autonomy and freedom. Securitizing identity, 
consenting to the use and sharing of personal information for the assurance of security, 
and protection, i.e. identity fraud, authenticating payments and transactions etc., 
illustrates the responsibilization of risk that lies on the customer. The securitization 
process also enables the biopolitical management over the population that controls and 
regulates access through the monitoring of customer behaviour and activities. The credit 
card industry is able to ‘govern at a distance’ through the freedom and choice of 
customers, facilitating a biopolitical apparatus that has a regulatory function to cancel the 
negative i.e. fraud, and promotes the positive i.e. economic growth. The 
responsibilization of risk also contains a ‘shifting of risk’, in which the onus of 
responsibility over the utilization of personal information is mitigated from the credit 
card company and transferred onto the customer; illustrating the neoliberal rationale of 
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risk – prudentialism, in which risk is shared, yet acted upon individually. Consenting to 
the collection, use and sharing of personal information is an individual responsibility of 
risk, and ensures blame on the customer. This keeps the customer in a state of 
subjectification. In other words, by shifting risk onto the customer, they are less able to 
challenge the procedures and practices of the company. The citizenship claims of 
freedom that mobilize customers to securitize identity and assume risk endorse 
apparatuses of control, and governance over the population. 
By securitizing identity, customers’ enable credit card companies to categorize 
and commodify their identities, the provisions state that Visa and Mastercard collect and 
use personal data and share it with third parties. The citizenship activities of customers 
allows for the construction of identities for particular objectives, like marketing, as listed 
in the terms. For example, the aggregation of personal information, i.e. shopping 
behaviour, family status and transactional information coincides with the function of 
biopolitics that makes populations knowable and visible. An extraction of the ‘vital signs’ 
of life that proceeds to sort and manage populations based on value and risk that has 
effects on their life chances. Although, there is a general awareness that information may 
be used for security, and targeted marketing purposes, it is unclear if customers are made 
aware of the credit card company’s explicit purposes on the utilization of data, the data 
that is collected and shared at the time, and the purposes of third party entities. 
Individuals are not made aware of the potential risks, or effects associated with 
consenting to the use and sharing of their personal information, nor are they explicitly 
informed on the lists of third parties their information is shared with, but are instead 
obligated to determine the risks for themselves. However, it can be implied through the 
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terms that the construction of partial identities, misuse of data, and exploitation of the 
customer population is possible. While customers have the opportunity to correct, and 
prevent the utilization of their data double, it remains difficult for customers to maintain 
control over it once they have consented to the rules of citizenship, i.e. engaging in 
transactions, authenticating identity. It is biopower that is exercised when companies 
acquire control over the information of populations; the manufacturing of identities and 
differentiation as valuable commodities is enabled and mobilized through consumer-
citizenship – which renders the population limited in power. As the promise of freedom 
coincides with, and manifests control, since power can only be exerted on those that are 
free.  
Analyzing the credit card policy provisions in accordance with the literature 
provides consumers with the necessary knowledge on how the credit card industry 
operates within Canada. It addresses how the securitization of identity is applied within 
the terms, and how consumers are manufactured as information commodities through 
consumer citizenship. Particularly, it brings awareness and knowledge to consumers to 
better understand the effects of consenting, and how to prevent the utilization of their 
personal information. There was an expectation to see biometric information reflected in 
the policies, although there was no explicit/expressed mention of the use of biometrics. 
The only implication of it was in the Visa Global Privacy Notice, 2018 section where it 
states personal information may be collected from third party digital wallets and online 
merchants when making online purchases. Digital wallets like Apple Pay allow the 
option to use biometrics when engaging in transactions; this implies that Visa would also 
receive biometric data. The policies not addressing this specifically could mean that they 
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simply were not specific enough, or they avoid mentioning the word biometrics as this 
invokes a grey area. Further, the use of biometrics has not been explicitly addressed 
within PIPEDA. An unclear understanding or ambiguous knowledge on the 
collection/use of biometric data hinders the ability of a customer to make an informed 
consent. For future research, a search of other credit card company policies indicating the 
use of biometrics would be suggested, along with an analysis on other entities policies 
regarding the use of personal information, i.e. data brokers, marketing companies, and 
social media entities. This would provide more detailed data for a more thorough analysis 
in how populations are categorized, commodified, and discriminated, and the effects of it 
on life chances. 
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